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THE DIALECTIC OF RIGHTS AND POLITICS:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT
ELIZABETH A. SCHNEIDER*
Integrating the experience of the women's rights movement with her own experience as
an activist and lawyer, Professor Elizabeth Schneider explores the role of rights dis-
course in the development of social movementn. Emphasizing the dialectic of rights
and politics, she developes an analysis that reflects the potential of rights both to ad-
vance and impede political struggle. Professor Schneider examines the role of rights in
claims for equality and reproductive choice and for protection from sexual harassment
and battering. She finds that although rights claims have illuminated the common
experience of women and helped affirm a sense of collective identity, they have not
adequately effected social change Professor Schneider concludes that afocus on rights
cannot, by itself achieve social reconstruction, but nevertheless argues that, properly
understood, rights discourse is a necessary aspect of any political and legal strategy for
change.
INTRODUCTION
The nature of legal rights has long been a subject of interest to legal
scholars and activists.' Recently, dialogue on the issue has intensified,
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1968, Bryn Mawr College;
M.S., 1969, The London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1973, New York
University School of Law.
Formerly Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, and Staff Attorney and Ad-
ministrative Director, Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Rutgers University School of Law-
Newark.
The research and writing of this Article were supported with grants from the Brooklyn
Law School Faculty Summer Research program. Earlier versions were presented at the Con-
ference on the Second Sex at the University of Pennsylvania (1984), Eighth and Ninth Annual
Meetings of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies in Washington, D.C. (1984) and Chest-
nut Hill, Massachusetts (1985), and the Feminist Legal Theory Workshop at the University of
Wisconsin Law School-Madison (1985).
The ideas discussed in this essay reflect the influence of many people. Arthur Kinoy,
Nancy Steams, and Rhonda Copelon shaped my view of rights as a lawyer; Ed Sparer's work
persuaded me to look at these questions from a theoretical perspective; and continuing dia-
logue with Martha Minow has encouraged and strengthened me to enter the conversation on
rights. I am particularly grateful to the many people who shared their ideas and responses
with me: Katharine Bartlett, Margaret Berger, Rhonda Copelon, Martha Fineman, Lucinda
Finley, Mary Joe Frug, Marsha Garrison, Linda Gordon, Joel Handler, Dirk Hartog, Bailey
Kuklin, Kathleen Lahey, Sylvia Law, Isabel Marcus, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Frances Olsen,
Deborah Rhode, Jack Schlegel, Carol Stack, Nadine Taub, David Trubek, and Wendy Wil-
liams. Sylvia Law's support and generosity helped me work. Christina Clarke, Jim Williams,
Judith Chananie, Linda Feldman, and Kathleen Turley provided helpful research assistance.
Joel Kosman has been an unusually skilled and sensitive editor.
I See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); S. Scheingold, The Politics of
Rights (1974). Frank Michelman has suggested that the range of theoretical justifications ad-
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provoked by numerous critiques of liberal rights, particularly by Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) scholars. 2 These recent critiques have tended to
view rights claims and rights consciousness 3 as distinct from and fre-
quently opposed to politics, and as an obstacle to the political growth and
development of social movement groups.4
This Article joins this dialogue on rights with a different voice. Re-
cent critiques of rights have looked at rights and politics as static catego-
ries, and focused primarily on the way in which rights claims and rights
consciousness mask and obscure important political choices and values.5
In this Article, I develop a dialectical perspective on rights. Central to
this perspective is an understanding of the dynamic interrelationship of
rights and politics, as well as the dual and contradictory potential of
rights discourse6 to blunt and advance political development. Here I de-
tail the rich, complex, and dynamic process through which political ex-
perience can shape the articulation of a right, and the way in which this
articulation then shapes the development of the political process. I also
explore the expressive aspect of rights claims and rights consciousness. I
focus on the way in which the assertion or "experience" of rights can
express political vision, affirm a group's humanity, contribute to an indi-
vidual's development as a whole person, and assist in the collective polit-
ical development of a social or political movement, particularly at its
early stages. In addition, I examine the importance of context to rights
assertion. The ability of a rights claim to constrain or assist a move-
ment's political vision and struggle for change depends upon the particu-
lar movement that asserts the right and the particular time at which it
does so. Thus, I turn to the recent women's movement's experience with
rights as an example of the complex dimensions of the dialectic of rights
and politics.
vanced in support of rights indicates that "[h]owever articulated, defended, or accounted for,
the sense of legal rights as claims whose realization has intrinsic value can fairly be called
rampant in our culture and traditions." Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Ac-
cess Fees: The Right to Protect One's Own Rights (pt. 1), 1973 Duke L.J. 1153, 1177.
2 See, e.g., A Critique of Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984); 36 Stan. L. Rev. i (1984)
(issue devoted to collection of articles by CLS scholars); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387 (1984).
3 Michelman defines rights consciousness as "involvement in a legal discourse that chan-
nels normative argument into claims of rights." F. Michelman, Student Rights and Rights
Consciousness: Reflections on the School Search Case (Jan. 17, 1985) (unpublished manuscript
on file at New York University Law Review). Peter Westen has recently questioned why we
use rights talk at all and has concluded that "the persuasiveness of rights discourse is to a
significant extent semantic." Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. Rev.
977, 978 (1986).
4 See text accompanying notes 19-46 infra.
5 Id.
6 1 intend the term rights discourse to encompass both rights claims and rights
consciousness.
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This Article emerges directly from my experience as a civil rights
lawyer who has assisted groups in asserting rights, and as a law teacher
who seeks to help students understand the role of law in social change.7
As lawyer and law teacher, I have sought to understand how, when, and
under what circumstances the use of fights claims by social movement
groups is useful, and what effect the use of rights claims has on social
movements. Further, my perspective has been shaped by social philoso-
phy, feminist theory, and my experience as an activist in the women's
movement. In this Article, I seek to integrate these diverse experiences
as part of an effort to understand the relationship between theory and
practice. Both the form and substance of this Article reflect my view
that it is important to explore theory and practice simultaneously and
look closely at how they are interrelated. 8
The interrelationship of theory and practice in the experience of so-
cial movements 9 interested me before I became a lawyer.10 But these
issues became critical to me in my work as a civil rights lawyer at the
Center for Constitutional Rights, an organization founded to provide
legal support for progressive social movements.1 At the Center, I
7 In this respect, I take seriously Ed Sparer's description of the work of a law teacher
committed to social change.
[Our] responsibility is not simply to expose doctrinal incoherencies and build historical
accounts. It is to point the way to a different kind of practice, one which utilizes that
historical account...
[Our job] is to study such practice, analyze its conditions, and demonstrate it... by
personal example....
[T]here is still another task: to demonstrate concern and ways of working... that
are helpful to some oppressed human beings ....
Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 573-74 (1984).
8 While CLS scholarship has purported to look at the interconnection of theory and prac-
tice, most CLS writing has looked only at theory. Sparer, supra note 7, at 554-55; see Trubek,
Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 589 (1984).
9 The term "social movement" encompasses the term "political movement" as well.
10 As an undergraduate, I studied philosophy with Richard Bernstein, and his work influ-
enced me enormously. See, e.g., R. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (1971) [hereinafter R. Bern-
stein, Praxis and Action]; R. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory
(1978). In particular, I learned about praxis and dialectics from him, and I attempted to apply
these concepts to social movements, specifically the New Left movements of the 1960s. See E.
Schneider, The Contemporary American Left: A Study in Political Dialectic (1968) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file at New York University Law Review). As a graduate student in
political science, I studied political sociology with Ralph Miliband, who helped me to focus on
the interrelationship between political theory and practice. See generally R. Miliband, The
State in Capitalist Society (1969).
11 The Center "was born in 1966 out of the southern civil rights struggle. Founded by
attorneys Arthur Kinoy, William M. Kunstler, Ben Smith and Morton Stavis, with the help of
Robert Boehm, it was soon joined by Peter Weiss and others dedicated to the creative use of
law as a positive force for social change." Center for Constitutional Rights, Docket Report
1985-1986 (on file at New York University Law Review).
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worked with other lawyers to articulate legal theory and fashion legal
relief responsive to the specific needs of social movements. My under-
standing of rights discourse was shaped by the Center's own rich history
and experience.1 2 Through my work within the women's movement, I
recognized the importance and power of legal theory derived from social
movement practice. Most recently, my experience as a law teacher, ex-
posure to the work of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies,13 and my
interest in feminist theory have shaped the particular theoretical frame-
work that I detail here.
Current characterizations of rights discourse have not adequately
captured either the richness or the complexity of the interrelationship of
rights and political struggle which I have experienced as an activist and
lawyer. I am moved to enter the dialogue on rights because I believe that
recent scholarship on rights reinforces current disillusionment with the
use of law for social change.14 This Article develops a perspective on
rights that describes the richly textured experience of law and social
movement practice. It is premised on a view of rights discourse that is
12 Center lawyers have been involved in a wide range of cases in the areas of government
misconduct, racial justice, women's rights, criminal justice, and international law. See A. Ki-
noy, Rights on Trial: The Odyssey of a People's Lawyer (1983); W. Kunstler, Trials and Trib-
ulations (1985).
13 The Conference on Critical Legal Studies is a loosely-organized group composed largely
of legal academics. The Conference offers "a set of viewpoints, descriptions, and prescriptions
that vary substantially from those embraced by the mainstream legal culture." President's
Page, 36 Stan. L. Rev. i, i (1984); see also The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (D.
Kairys ed. 1982) (essays on CLS, social role and operation of law, and alternative progressive
approaches written by members of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies and the Theoreti-
cal Studies Committee of the National Lawyers Guild).
14 While it is understandable that the Reagan Administration's policies and changes in the
composition of the federal judiciary could have this effect, it is important to resist it. An
example of the Administration's move away from the language of rights is reflected in a recent
report designed "to study the ethical and legal implications of differences in the availability of
health services." 1 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Securing Access to Health Care 1 (1983). This report
supported a societal obligation to ensure equitable access to health care, id. at 4, but not a
corresponding right to health care itself. See Bayer, Ethics, Politics, and Access to Health
Care: A Critical Analysis of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 303, 319-20 (1984).
The concept of positive or social welfare rights has emerged in recent American history
as the most potent political language for those seeking to make claims against an inegal-
itarian social structure. By explicitly rejecting the concept of a right to health care, thus
breaking with recent public discourse on this matter, the Commission deprived those
poorly served by the current health care system of a language with which to express
their discontent. In so doing, the Commission implicitly adopted a perspective that
views social change as the consequence of the recognition of moral obligations by the
socially powerful, rather than as a result of demands pressed from below as a matter of
rights. Though such a conservative reading of history might be defended, it ought not
be put forward in the guise of a theoretical refinement of philosophical terminology.
Id.
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independent of the success or failure of a particular rights claim in a
particular court. I set forth this alternative perspective in a tentative and
speculative way, as this Article is a beginning effort in a larger project.
By developing the outlines of this perspective and formulating issues for
further work, I hope to recast, even in some small way, the current dia-
logue on rights.15
This Article has five parts. Part I provides an overview of the pres-
ent CLS and feminist critiques of rights. In Part II, I detail the method-
ology which shapes this Article and then discuss feminist theory and
feminist legal practice as examples of it. Next, in Part III, I develop the
contours of a dialectical perspective on rights. Then, in Part IV, I turn to
specific examples from the rights experience of the women's movement to
examine the way in which rights emerge from, and are shaped by, polit-
ical struggle. Finally, in Part V, I draw on the women's rights experience
to reconsider a dialectical perspective on rights.
I
THE DEBATE ON RIGHTS
The idea that legal rights have some intrinsic value is widespread in
our culture. 16 A rights claim can make a statement of entitlement that is
universal and categorical.1 7 This entitlement can be seen as negative be-
cause it protects against intrusion by the state (a right to privacy), or the
same right can be seen as affirmative because it enables an individual to
do something (a right to choose whether to bear a child). Thus, a rights
claim can define the boundaries of state power and the entitlement to do
something, and, by extension, provide an affirmative vision of human so-
ciety. Rights claims reflect a normative theory of the person, but a nor-
mative theory can see the rights-bearing individual as isolated or it can
see the individual as part of a larger social network.18 Recently, legal
scholars, in particular CLS and feminist scholars, have debated the
meanings of rights claims and have questioned the significance of legal
argumentation focused on rights.
Is One historian of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies recently observed that there is
a "recent explosive growth of a serious feminist presence in the group." Schlegel, Notes To-
ward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391,410 (1984). He noted that "this presence, dominated as it is with
a heavy legal rights analysis and agenda, cannot but alter an organization that has until now
eschewed such an approach to law in favor of grander social theory and explanation." Id. To
the extent that this Article reflects a "heavy legal rights analysis and agenda" from a feminist
perspective, I hope that Schlegel's prediction is not unduly optimistic.
16 Michelman, supra note 1, at 1177.
17 F. Michelman, Hayek's Complaint (Dec. 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at New
York University Law Review).
18 See id.
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CLS scholars question whether rights claims and rights discourse
can facilitate social reconstruction.1 9 The CLS critique has several inter-
related themes which flow from a more general critique of liberalism.20
CLS scholars argue that liberalism is premised on dichotomies, such as
individual and community or self and other, that divide the world into
two mutually exclusive spheres. Rights claims only perpetuate these di-
19 See Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369 (1982-
1983); Olsen, supra note 2; Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
20 Sparer, supra note 7, at 516. Sparer notes, however, that the definitions of liberalism
used by CLS scholars are extremely broad. For example, liberalism has been defined in the
following way:
In its broadest expression, liberalism is defined as "the dominant ideology in the
modem Western world, an ideology that pervades our views of human nature and of
social life." It is not confined to the "liberal-conservative" debate in American politics,
though it includes both strands of that debate. Liberalism is so fundamental to our
thinking "that it can be contrasted only with radically different ways of understanding
the world, such as that based on medieval thought or that derived from modem critiques
of liberalism itself."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057,
1074 (1980)).
Karl Klare has described "liberal legalism" in the following way:
I mean by "liberal legalism" the particular historical incarnation of legalism...
which characteristically serves as the institutional and philosophical foundation of the
legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commit-
ment to general "democratically" promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens
before the law, and the radical separation of morals, politics and personality from judi-
cial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social practices and institu-
tions that complement and elaborate on its underlying jurisprudence. With respect to its
modem Anglo-American form these include adherence to precedent, separation of the
legislative (prospective) and judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to formu-
late legal rules on a general basis (the notion of ration decidendO, adherence to complex
procedural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of analysis ("legal reason-
ing"). The rise and elaboration of the ideology, practices and institutions of liberal legal-
ism have been accompanied by the growth of a specialized, professional caste of experts
trained in manipulating "legal reasoning" and the legal process.
Liberal legalist jurisprudence and its institutions are closely related to the classical
liberal political tradition, exemplified in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The
metaphysical underpinnings of liberal legalism are supplied by the central themes of that
tradition: the notion that values are subjective and derive from personal desire, and that
therefore ethical discourse is conducted profitably only in instrumental terms; the view
that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals; the separation in
political philosophy between public and private interest, between state and civil society;
and a commitment to a formal or procedural rather than a substantive conception of
justice.
Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 Telos 123, 132 n.28 (1979). For earlier definitions of "liberal
legalism," see Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Chal-
lenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 529, 550-55 (1977); Trubek
& Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Devel-
opment Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1062, 1070-72.
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chotomies,21 which, to CLS scholars, limit legal thinking and inhibit nec-
essary social change. CLS scholars base their critique of rights on the
inherently individualistic nature of rights under legal liberalism, the "re-
ification" of rights generally, and the indeterminate nature of rights
claims.
CLS scholars argue that rights are "permeated by the possessive in-
dividualism of capitalist society."' 22 Because rights "belong" to individu-
als-rights rhetoric portrays individuals as "separated owners of their
respective bundles of rights23-they are necessarily individualistic." This
notion of ownership delimits the boundaries of state authority from that
of individual autonomy, the self from other. Rights discourse tends to
overemphasize the separation of the individual from the group, and
thereby inhibits an individual's awareness of her connection to and mu-
tual dependence upon others.24
CLS scholars also see rights discourse as taking on a "thing-like"
quality-a fixed and external meaning-that "freezes and falsifies" rich
and complex social experience. 25 This "attribution of a thing-like or
fixed character to socially constructed phenomena," called reification, "is
an essential aspect of alienated consciousness, leading people to accept
existing social orders as the inevitable 'facts of life.' "26 This process thus
gives people a sense of "substitute connection" and an illusory sense of
community that disables any real connection.27 Finally, these scholars
21 Sparer, supra note 7, at 516-17; see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063, 1108
(1981); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 209, 212-13
(1979).
22 Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1417, 1418 (1984); see also Gabel, supra note
19, at 1577 (explaining how our self-identity is based, in large part, on individualistic nature of
rights).
23 Olsen, supra note 2, at 393.
24 F. Michelman, supra note 3, at 23.
25 Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1984); see also Gabel,
supra note 19, at 1582 (discussing how we give a "false concreteness" to legal concepts and
rights); Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1382 (discussing how we conceptualize rights as real based
upon our experiences in exercise of those rights).
26 Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 373 n.10.
27 In describing the process of substitute connection, Gabel writes:
As soon as we begin to look for it, we find this substitute connection throughout
legal thought in what we might call the latent content of rights themselves. By repre-
senting our alienated performances as exercises of the rights to freedom of speech, free-
dom of contract, equality of opportunity, good faith cooperation, and so on, we "make it
the law" that these performances be conceived as embodying the qualities that would
characterize genuine connection. While at the purely rational, or manifest, level, these
abstract rights signify only the universally allowed possible actions available to each
individual in suspended form (we imagine we "have" these possible actions, and in act-
ing "exercise" them, through a process of simple deduction), at the irrational, or latent,
level they link the totality of our current alienated experience with the realization of
desire as a collective fantasy. To the extent that these legal images of our existing social
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see rights claims as indeterminate because argumentation based on rights
does not solve the problem of how to resolve conflicts between rights
28
and cannot transform social relations.29
CLS scholars criticize the use of rights claims by social movement
groups on related grounds.30 They argue that the use of rights discourse
by a social movement group and the consequent reliance on rights can
keep people passive and dependent upon the state because it is the state
which grants them their rights. 31 Individuals are only allowed to act-to
"exercise their rights"-to the degree to which the state permits. 32 Legal
strategies based on rights discourse, then, tend to weaken the power of a
popular movement by allowing the state to define the movement's
goals. 33 Rights discourse obscures real political choice and determina-
tion. 34 Further, it fosters social antagonisms by magnifying disagreement
within and conflicts between groups over rights. 35 From a strategic per-
spective, then, reliance on rights by social movements can be politically
debilitating.36
Nevertheless, at least one prominent CLS scholar sees rights claims
as potentially important and useful. To this end, Duncan Kennedy urges
the "transformation of rights rhetoric."
[T]he critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply that the
left should abandon rights rhetoric as a tool of political organizing or
legal argument. Embedded in the rights notion is a liberating accom-
plishment of our culture: the affirmation of free human subjectivity
against the constraints of group life, along with the paradoxical
countervision of a group life that creates and nurtures individuals ca-
pable of freedom. We need to work at the slow transformation of
life produce mere fantasies of connection, it seems accurate to say that through them we
"use" our desire for connection to legitimize our real absence of connection, just as
patriotism is often used to produce a feeling of unreal solidarity in order to deny our real
experience of a lack of solidarity. Yet, as with patriotism, our production of these legal
images in common from our dispersed and withdrawn locations reveals our residual
ontological bond. Although we are absorbed in a collective fantasy, we are actually still
together insofar as we are "watching the same movie."
Gabel, supra note 19, at 1580 (footnote omitted).
28 See Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 503, 506
(1981); Kare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining
Law, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 450, 478 (1981); Olsen, supra note 2, at 389; Tushnet, supra note 19, at
1375-82; Dalton, Book Review, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 229, 235 (1983).
29 Klare, supra note 20, at 133-34.
30 See Gabel, supra note 19, at 1573; Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1384.
31 See Gabel, supra note 19, at 1577.
32 See id. at 1578 (noting that people silently agree to this relationship allowing state to
define their individual rights).
33 Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 375.
34 Id. at 375-79; Olsen supra note 2, at 391; Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1394.
35 See Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 376 n.13; Olsen, supra note 2, at 390.
36 Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1375-85.
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rights rhetoric, at dereifying it, rather than simply junking it.3 7
Some feminist critiques of rights see fights claims as formal and hi-
erarchical-premised on a view of law as patriarchal.38 From this per-
spective, law generally, and rights particularly, reflect a male viewpoint
characterized by objectivity, distance, and abstraction. 39 As Catharine
MacKinnon, a leading exponent of this position writes, "Abstract rights
will authoritize the male experience of the world."'4 However, these crit-
ics do not argue that rights claims should be given up completely
either.41
Some legal writers see similarities between the CLS critique of rights
based on "liberal legalism" and the feminist critique based on "patri-
archy."'42 Both liberal legalism and patriarchy rely upon the same set of
dichotomies.43 Further, the critiques usefully emphasize the indetermi-
nacy of rights, and the ways in which fights discourse can reinforce alien-
ation and passivity. Both critiques highlight the ways in which rights
discourse can become divorced from political struggle. They appropri-
ately warn us of the dangers social movements and lawyers encounter
when relying on rights to effect social change.
But both critiques are incomplete. They do not take account of the
complex, and I suggest dialectical, relationship between the assertion of
rights and political struggle in social movement practice.44 They see only
37 Kennedy, supra note 28, at 506; see also Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 376 n.13
(many lawyers on left support use of rights rhetoric to aid effective political organizing).
38 See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 635, 644-45 (1983); Olsen, supra note 2, at 400;
Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in The Politics of Law 294, 300-02 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 Harv. Women's L.J. 83 (1980).
39 See MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 645 ("[L]aw not only reflects a society in which men
rule women; it rules in a male way."); Polan, supra note 38, at 301 ("The whole structure of
law-its hierarchical organization; its combative, adversarial format; and its undeviating bias
in favor of rationality over all other values-defines it as a fundamentally patriarchal institu-
tion."); see also Rifldn, supra note 38, at 84, 87 (arguing that this ideology of law masks
underlying social and political questions, thereby reinforcing its own legitimacy). Carol Gilli-
gan's work suggests that rights-based jurisprudence, characterized by objectivity, distance, ab-
straction, and hierarchy, might be distinctively male. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice
(1982), discussed in text accompanying notes 113-48 infra. For example, Olsen reads Gilligan
to suggest that "Iliberal legalism.., might seem to be a 'masculine' response to problems."
Olsen, supra note 2, at 400 n.64.
40 MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 658.
41 See Olsen, supra note 2, at 401; Polan, supra note 38, at 300-01.
42 Olsen, supra note 2, at 400 n.64; see D. Trubek, Taking Rights Lightly? Radical Voices
in Legal Theory 16 (Oct. 8, 1984) (paper on file at New York University Law Review).
43 See F. Olsen, The Sex of Law (1984) (paper on file at New York University Law Re-
view); Trubek, supra note 42, at 20-23.
44 Ed Sparer has observed that the CLS exaggeration of the negative aspects of rights dis-
course promotes an "'undialectical' approach despite Critical theory's emphasis on dialec-
tics." Sparer, supra note 7, at 519. He argues that CLS has not grasped the dialectics of
rights. "As much as rights are instruments of legitimizing oppression, they are also affirma-
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the limits of rights, and fail to appreciate the dual possibilities of rights
discourse.45 Admittedly, rights discourse can reinforce alienation and in-
dividualism, and can constrict political vision and debate. But, at the
same time, it can help to affirm human values, enhance political growth,
and assist in the development of collective identity.
By failing to see that both possibilities exist simultaneously, these
critiques have rigidified, rather than challenged, the classic dichotomies
of liberal thought-law and politics, individual and community, and ulti-
mately, rights and politics. Radical social theory, such as CLS and femi-
nist scholarship, must explore the dialectical dimensions of each
dichotomy, not reinforce the sense that the dichotomies are frozen and
static. Radical social theory must explain how these dichotomies can be
transcended.46
II
DIALECTICS AND PRAXIS AS METHODOLOGY: THE
EXAMPLES OF FEMINIST THEORY AND FEMINIST
LEGAL PRACTICE
My perspective on rights is grounded in a view of the dialectical
tions of human values. As often as they are used to frustrate social movement, they are also
among the basic tools of social movement." Id. at 555.
45 For other, arguably more appreciative, analyses of the possibilities of rights discourse,
see, e.g., Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of Group Based Theory
for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1 Law & Inequality: J. Theory & Prac. 191, 236-37 (1983)
(seeking to expand individualistic nature of rights by adding group component); Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Af. 107, 158-60 (1976) (arguing for a group-
disadvantaging principle based on experience of Blacks to replace narrow vision of equality
based on individual disadvantage); Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of
Liberalism, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev., 599, 610 (1979) (noting that "legal system is over-
whelmingly geared to the conception of redressing individual grievances, not of vindicating
group rights"); Lynd, supra note 22, at 1421 (1984) (searching for rights that "do not require a
choice between our own well-being and the well-being of others); Sparer, supra note 7, at 515
(arguing that "H]iberal rights theory may be incoherent, but certain liberal rights themselves
need be defended, not disparaged"); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 561, 597-648 (1983) (arguing that rights, properly asserted, can help transform society by
revealing interrelationship between self and community); Villmoare, The Left's Problems With
Rights, 9 Legal Stud. F. 39, 42 (1985) (arguing for rights as ideological and concrete force tied
to exercise of political power and capable of use as political weapon).
46 Trubek suggests that
the point is not to say that object is better than subject, public than private, female than
male: rather, the point is to do away with a representational structure that seems to force
us to such choices because it carves the world up this way. Indeed, the desire to tran-
scend, deconstruct, the dualism may be what distinguishes the radical from the liberal
voice.
D. Trubek, supra note 42, at 27-28.
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nature of consciousness and social change47 and a view that theory and
practice must be understood as interrelated. 48 These ideas shape the
methodology of my analysis. My effort is to transcend the purported
oppositions of rights and politics, theory and practice, individual and
community, and to understand their dialectical relationship. In this way,
I hope to describe how two purportedly contradictory notions can, at the
same time, be inextricably linked to one another, such as the liberating
and constraining aspects of rights discourse. Rights discourse may some-
times appear to be distinct from politics and an obstacle to political
growth, but it is actually part of a larger process of political struggle.
The concept of dialectics has shaped much of contemporary social
theory49 and has developed different meanings and uses. Most signifi-
cantly here, it stands for the idea of the process, connection, and opposi-
tion of dualities, and for subsequent change and transcendence. The
dialectical approach that I use in this Article explores the process which
connects ideas that appear to be in opposition to one another. One "mo-
ment" in the process gives rise to its own negation, and "out of this nega-
tivity, emerges a 'moment' which at once negates, affirms, and transcends
the 'moment' involved in the struggle."'50 Thus, an idea may be both
what it appears to be and something else at the same time; the idea may
contain the seeds of its own contradiction, and ideas that appear to be in
opposition may really be the same or connected. At any given "mo-
ment," ideas may appear to be connected or in opposition because this
connection or opposition exists in only one stage of a larger process. The
dialectical process is not a mechanical confrontation of an opposite from
outside, but an organic emergence and development of opposition and
change from within the "moment" or idea itself.5 1
47 Karl Klare explains the dialectical theory of consciousness as the basis for a "constitu-
tive" theory of law.
[This] dialectical theory of consciousness-a theory of human self-activity or objectifica-
tion as social world-creating...; a conception of people as beings in relation to, and
dependent on, others; a conception of the relationship of subject and object in which the
subject derives its contents from objects and relationships external to it, but nevertheless
one in which the subject shapes, changes, and gives meaning to objects in the process of
coming to know them.
Klare, supra note 20, at 128.
48 While some CLS scholarship theoretically accepts the interconnection of theory and
practice, not much CLS writing has actually examined this interconnection. See Sparer, supra
note 7, at 552-55; Trubek, supra note 8, at 589.
49 See R. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, supra note 10, at xiii (discussing importance of
dialectical approaches to range of philosophical schools since Hegel).
SO Id. at 20-21.
51 In Praxis and Action, Bernstein describes the process of dialectics in the following way:
There has been a lot of loose talk about Hegel's dialectic being a movement from thesis
to antithesis to synthesis. Not only do these concepts play an insignificant role in
Hegel's philosophy, they are essentially static concepts and completely misrepresent
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The critiques of rights that I have described suffer from an analysis
that divorces theory from practice.52 Rights are analyzed in the abstract,
viewed as static-as a form of legal theory separate from social prac-
tice-and then criticized for being formal and abstract. My approach to
rights views theory and practice as dialectically related, and I look to the
philosophical concept of praxis to describe this process. The fundamen-
tal aspect of praxis is the active role of consciousness and subjectivity in
shaping both theory and practice, and the dynamic interrelationship that
results.53 As Karl Klare has explained, lawmaking can be a form of
praxis; it can be constitutive, creative, and an expression of "the embed-
dedness of action-in-belief and belief-in-action. ' 54 For purposes of this
Article, my focus on praxis impels me to explore how rights claims can
flow from and express the political and moral aspirations of a social
movement group, how rights claims are experienced or perceived in so-
cial movement practice, and how rights discourse impacts on social
movement practice generally.
My methodological lens for viewing rights-the concepts of dialec-
tics and praxis-is shaped by my philosophical orientation as well as my
own experience of rights. Both feminist theory and feminist legal prac-
what Hegel means by "dialectic." The dialectic of Geist is essentially a dynamic and
organic process. One "moment" of a dialectical process, when it is fully developed or
understood gives rise to its own negation; it is not mechanically confronted by an antith-
esis. The process here is more like that of a tragedy where the "fall" of the tragic hero
emerges from the dynamics of the development of his own character. When Geist is
dirempted, alienated from itself, a serious struggle takes place between the two "mo-
ments." Out of this conflict and struggle, out of this negativity, emerges a "moment"
which at once negates, affirms, and transcends the "moments" involved in the struggle-
these earlier moments are aufgehoben. In the course of Geist realizing itself, this process
which involves a stage of self-alienation that is subsequently aufgehoben is a continuous,
restless, infinite one. The logic of the development of Geist is dialectical where Geist
struggles with what appears to be "other" than it-a limitation, or obstacle which must
be overcome. Geist "returns to itself" when it overcomes the specific obstacle that it
encounters, only to renew the dialectical process again. Geist finally "returns to itself"
when all obstacles and determinations have been overcome, when everything that has
appeared "other" than itself is fully appropriated and thereby subjectivized. This is the
final aim or goal of Geist. The negativity and activity of Geist come into focus in this
dialectical characterization.
Id. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted). Kathleen Lahey observed that although I use the notion of
dialectic as a means of transcending a dualistic or dichotomized formulation of rights and
politics, the notion of dialectic is nonetheless premised on a dualistic framework. As I see it,
however, the dialectical process has many dimensions and is not simply dualistic since, as
Bernstein writes, it is a process of constant and organic change.
52 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1394.
53 See R. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, supra note 10, at 42-43. Praxis describes "a unity
of theory and action." Sparer, supra note 7, at 553 (footnote omitted). It is used in this essay
as it was used in Sparer's "as a shorthand term for the theory-practice-social change relation-
ship." Id. at 553 n.10. Karl Klare uses the term praxis in the broadest sense--"any social-
world producing activity." Klare, supra note 20, at 124 n.5.
54 Klare, supra note 20, at 124 n.5.
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tice exemplify aspects of this methodological perspective55 and shape my
approach to rights. Over the last several years, feminist theoretical work
in a range of disciplines has made important contributions to the devel-
opment of social and political theory. 56 This work emphasizes dialectical
change and the relationship between theory and practice, thereby enrich-
ing social perspectives on law and understandings of rights. 57 At the
same time, my experience with feminist legal practice gives me a concrete
understanding of the dialectical nature of rights discourse-of the way in
which rights claims can not only constrain, but also can creatively ex-
press political vision, and the way in which rights claims can be under-
stood as a form of praxis.
A. Feminist Theory
Feminist theory is characterized by an emphasis on dialectical pro-
cess 58 and the interrelationship of theory and practice. Feminist theory
55 See text accompanying notes 58-91 infra.
56 Feminist theoretical work has exploded in the last ten years with the institutionalization
of women's studies programs and courses. See, e.g., A Feminist Perspective in the Academy
(E. Langland & W. Gove ed. 1981); Men's Studies Modified (D. Spender ed. 1981); The Study
of Women: Enlarging Perspectives of Social Reality (E. Snyder ed. 1979); see also Feminist
Studies (feminist theoretical journal); Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y (same).
57 There has been a recent outpouring of legal scholarship grounded in feminist theory that
seeks to apply feminist theory to law generally. See, e.g., Cole, Getting There: Reflections on
Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 59, 79-90
(1985); Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buffalo L. Rev.
11, 12 (1985)[hereinafter Feminist Discourse]; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J.
447, 480-508; Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narrative on the Role
of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339, 344 (1985). So applied, feminist theory "can provide for a recon-
ceptualization of some of the most basic terms of political life." K. Ferguson, The Feminist
Case Against Bureaucracy 166 (1984). I believe that feminist theory has much to offer legal
thinking, and indeed feminist jurisprudence was recognized as such at the Association of
American Law Schools' Annual Meeting, which included a panel on feminist jurisprudence as
part of the Mini-Workshop on Emerging Trends in Legal Scholarship and Legal Education
(Los Angeles, California 1987), which I recently attended. Still, I am concerned that feminist
theory will become oversimplified and canonized as it becomes more widely accessible. Femi-
nist theory is significant precisely because it is dynamic and complex. If feminist theory be-
comes an intellectual commodity within legal thought, feminist analysis will be marginalized
and stultified.
58 The notion of a dialectical process is a critical aspect of feminist theory. The term dia-
lectical and the concept of dialectic are frequently used by feminist theorists in a wide range of
contexts. See, e.g., S. De Beauvoir, The Second Sex xvi-xxi (1952) (discussing dialectical rela-
tionship between one and other, master and slave); K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 197 (writing
that "[a] community that recognizes the dialectical need for connectedness within freedom and
for diversity within solidarity would strive to nurture the capacity for reflexive redefinition of
self"); C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 174 (discussing "the dialectic of human development");
A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature 12 (1983) (discussing "the on-going and dia-
lectical process of feminist theorizing"); New French Feminisms: An Anthology xi-xii (E.
Marks & I. de Courtivron ed. 1981) (writing that recent French feminists "take from...
dialectics those modes of thinking that allow them to make the most connections between the
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emphasizes the value of direct and personal experience as the place that
theory should begin, 59 as embodied in the phrase "the personal is polit-
ical." 60 This phrase reflects the view that the realm of personal experi-
ence, the "private" which has always been trivialized, particularly for
women, is an appropriate and important subject of public inquiry, and
that the "private" and "public" worlds are inextricably linked.61 The
notion of consciousness-raising as feminist method62 flows from this in-
sight. In consciousness-raising groups, learning starts with the individual
and personal (the private), moves to the general and social (the public),
and then reflects back on itself with heightened consciousness through
this shared group process. Consciousness-raising as feminist method is a
form of praxis because it transcends the theory and practice dichotomy.
Consciousness-raising groups start with personal and concrete experi-
ence, integrate this experience into theory, and then, in effect, reshape
theory based upon experience and experience based upon theory. Theory
expresses63 and grows out of experience but it also relates back to that
experience for further refinement, validation, or modification.
oppression of women and other aspects of their culture"); Feminist Discourse, supra note 57,
at 86 (comment by C. Menkel-Meadow) (discussing process of development within women's
movement as "part of a much larger dialectical process where we begin with a reform, be it
liberal, radical, or in some cases even conservative, and some of us unite behind it while others
do not").
59 A. Jaggar, supra note 58, at 101; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soe'y 515, 534-36 (1982).
60 Z. Eisenstein, Feminism and Sexual Equality 11 (1984).
61 See MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 655-56; MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 534-35; see
also Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 1457, 1500, 1510-11 (1983) (structure of consciousness that divides interdependent
spheres of market and family has limited effectiveness of reform, leaving women subjugated in
both spheres).
62 Catharine MacKinnon maintains that "consciousness-raising is the major technique of
analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of social change of the
women's movement." MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 519. Sylvia Law recently emphasized the
critical role that consciousness-raising has played in the rise of feminism and still can play in
social problem solving generally. She observed that "feminist consciousness-raising is a pro-
cess of self-reflection and action that values women's personal experience and understands that
experience as political." Law, Book Review, 95 Yale L.J. 1769, 1784 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted). For feminist works on consciousness-raising, see J. Cassell, A Group Called Women:
Sisterhood & Symbolism in the Feminist Movement 15-20 (1977); S. Evans, Personal Politics:
The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left 214-32
(1979); Bose, Consciousness-Raising, in Mother Was Not a Person 176, 176-84 (M. Anderson
ed. 1972); Hartsock, Fundamental Feminism: Process and Perspective, 2 Quest: Feminist Q.
67, 71-79 (1975); McWilliams, Contemporary Feminism, Consciousness-Raising and Chang-
ing Views of the Political, in Women in Politics 157, 157-70 (J. Jacquette ed. 1974). Conscious-
ness-raising also reflects a political understanding about the interrelatedness of women's
subordination in the private sphere (the family) and the public sphere (the market). See Olsen,
supra note 61, at 1510-11.
63 Cf. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 64
(1984) (legal theory can be expressive because it "can help create communal ties and shared
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The idea of consciousness-raising as a method of analysis suggests
an approach to social change which recognizes dynamic tension, reflec-
tion, and sharing as essential aspects of growth. Feminist theory values
this process which starts with experience, generalizes through self-reflec-
tion and evaluation, and then returns to experience. This dialectical pro-
cess transcends the oppositions of self and other, public and private,
individual and community, and is simultaneously grounded in an under-
standing that any connections between these apparent dualisms will be
only partial and tentative, and that distinctions will again emerge.64
Feminist theory thus reveals the social dimension of individual expe-
rience and the individual dimension of social experience. It recognizes
"the dialectical tension between freedom that does not entail isolation
and community that does not enforce uniformity. '65 In particular, it val-
ues the dynamic interrelationship of the individual and community.
"Feminist discourse and practice entail a struggle for individual auton-
omy that is with others and for community that embraces diversity-that
is, for an integration of the individual and the collective in an ongoing
process of authentic individuation and genuine connectedness. ' '66
The fact that this process begins with the self, and then connects to
the larger world of women, is important. For feminists, theory is not
"out there," but rather is based on the concrete, daily, and "trivial" ex-
periences of individuals, and so emerges from the shared experience of
women talking. Because feminist theory grows out of direct experience
and consciousness actively asserting itself, feminist theory emphasizes
context and the importance of identifying experience and claiming it for
one's own.
67
Feminist theory involves a particular methodology, but it also has a
substantive viewpoint and political orientation.6 8 Recognizing the links
values by forcing us from the sense that current practices and doctrines are natural and neces-
sary and by suggesting new forms of expression to replace outworn ones").
64 Many feminist theorists have alluded to the process of consciousness-raising as one in
which these distinctions are transcended in a dialectical fashion. See sources cited in note 62
supra. Similarly, MacKinnon sees consciousness-raising as dialectical method. She sees it as
"a collective 'sympathetic internal experience of the gradual construction of [the] system ac-
cording to its inner necessity .... '" MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 536 (quoting F. Jameson,
Marxism and Form xi (1971)).
65 K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 198.
66 Id. at 157 (emphasis omitted).
67 A. Jaggar, supra note 58, at 11.
68 Substantively, feminist theory is concerned with the articulation of women's voices and
issues of silence. Power gives people a voice and lack of power silences them. Women's voices
and experiences have not been heard because the subordination of women has denied them
access to power. See sources cited in note 57 supra. As feminist scholars understand that
women's experience and history have been submerged, they feel compelled to discover, recast,
and reclaim women's experience. For example, Kathy Ferguson notes that feminist discourse
contains two related dimensions.
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between individual change and social change means understanding the
importance of political activity, not just theory. Theory emerges from
practice and practice then informs and reshapes theory. At the same
time, because of its dialectical cast, feminist theory encompasses a notion
of process that encourages a grounded and reflective appreciation of this
interrelationship-its possibilities and limits, visions and defeats.
B. Feminist Legal Practice: Feminist Theory in Practice
While feminist theory has shaped my view of the relationship be-
tween theory and practice, much of my perspective on the use of rights
has understandably been shaped by my own experience as a lawyer. In a
sense, this Article is both a lesson in and example of praxis. My view of
The first is the buried historical knowledge about women, about what women have done
and been, spoken and dreamed, sought and found. These blocks of historical knowledge
are present to a degree in the dominant domain of discourse, but they are disguised and
distorted; the task of feminist scholarship is and has been to unearth this buried knowl-
edge. The second is women's invisible and disqualified knowledge about themselves and
their world ....
K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 157; see also, e.g., C. Christ, Diving Deep and Surfacing: Wo-
men Writers on Spiritual Quest (1980) (essays on women's spiritual quest and mystical expe-
riences as portrayed in works by leading female authors and poets); A. Jaggar, supra note 58
(discussion and evaluation of different feminist theories on women's oppression and liberation);
Feminism and Philosophy (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English ed. 1977) (collec-
tion of essays presenting various views of feminism as an ethical theory); New French Femi-
nisms: An Anthology, supra note 58 (collection of essays representing spectrum of new French
feminism since 1968 by French authors); The Future of Difference (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine
ed. 1980) (collection of essays drawn from "The Scholar and the Feminist VI: The Future of
Difference," sponsored by the Barnard College Women's Center in 1979); Toward an Anthro-
pology of Women (R. Reiter ed. 1975) (collection of essays applying anthropological methods
to explain subjugation of women); Woman, Culture, and Society (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere
ed. 1974) (essays discussing issues ranging from role of biology in asymetrical relation of sexes
to nature, implications, and extent of female power in social processes).
Feminist theory has also come to recognize the difference in sameness. Much feminist
theory emphasizes women's divergent experiences-that women are not all the same, that wo-
men are divided by race and class, and that there is no single experience for all women. See,
e.g., P. Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in
America 183-97 (1984) (arguing that issues have been promoted by white feminists which were
not in the interests of black women); B. Hooks, Feminist Theory: From the Margin to the
Center 43-65 (1984) (arguing that to build sustained feminist movement women must confront
sexism, racism, and classism that divide women from one another); Powell, Black Macho and
Black Feminism, in Home Girls 283, 291-92 (B. Smith ed. 1983) (calling for continued devel-
opment of black feminist politics because issues of racism and sexism impact black women
disproportionately); The Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in All the
Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us are Brave 13, 13-22 (G. Hull, P.
Bellscott & B. Smith ed. 1982) (discussing oppression Afro-American women have suffered
from in white, patriarchical society).
At the same time, feminist theory reveals sameness in difference-that women regardless
of race, class, and culture have commonly been subordinated and so need to unite based upon
the desire to eliminate all group oppression. See Z. Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 11-15; B.
Hooks, supra, at 61-65.
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the dialectical relationship between rights and politics, and theory and
practice, has been formed by my own work. I will detail some of this
experience to explain my perspective on the importance of a dialectical
approach to rights.
As a college student in the 1960s, active in civil rights and other
political work, and studying political science and social theory, I saw
many examples from the civil rights movement of lawyers using the law
to advance the political efforts of social movement groups. Yet I also
observed that the law could be used to constrain political organizing and
vision. For that reason, although strongly drawn to law school, I chose
to do other work instead. During this time I became actively involved in
the women's movement, and my experience as an activist gave me the
incentive and impetus to go to law school. It was 1970, and efforts to
reshape the law to include women's experience were just beginning.
There was a need for women with a feminist perspective to go to law
school.
First as a law student and then as a lawyer, I was privileged to work
at the Center for Constitutional Rights. Center lawyers had a long his-
tory of using the law to affect social change and to change the law to
reflect the experience of those previously excluded by the law. In the
early 1970s, women lawyers on the Center's staff began to work on wo-
men's rights issues.69
We asserted rights not simply to advance legal argument or to win a
case, but to express the politics, vision, and demands of a social move-
ment, and to assist in the political self-definition of that movement. We
understood that winning legal rights would not be meaningful without
political organizing to ensure enforcement of and education concerning
those rights.70 Through the work at the Center, the law was used to
capture a vision of and advance a burgeoning sense of community. There
was an important understanding that lawmaking could be a form of
69 I started working at the Center as a law student in 1971 and left the Center in 1980.
Nancy Stearns, Rhonda Copelon, Janice Goodman, and I worked primarily on women's rights
issues. Many other lawyers, either on the Center staff or as Center cooperating attorneys,
worked closely with us. We operated as a close group-part of a network of feminist litigators
around the country who attempted to use our experience as women, as activists, and as women
lawyers to reshape the law by including women's perspective in it. We worked in a wide
variety of legal areas: pregnancy discrimination, employment discrimination, reproductive
rights, and violence against women, as lead counsel and sometimes in an amicus curiae capac-
ity. We worked with other lawyers to analyze problems from a feminist perspective and to
translate our analysis into legal argumentation to be presented to the courts. We also were
involved in a wide range of other activities, such as legislative reform, public speaking, political
organizing, and outreach work. More recently, other Center lawyers such as Anne Simon,
Sarah Wunsch, and Ellen Yaroshefsky have continued this work.
70 Although the enforcement of rights is a critical element in evaluating the significance of
rights claims, discussion of rights enforcement is beyond the scope of this Article.
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praxis. It could be constitutive and creative, and it could have political
meaning independent of its success or failure in the courts.
Of the many cases on which I worked at the Center, one, State v.
Wanrow, 71 stands out for me because it so clearly demonstrates that legal
argumentation which is tied to and expresses the concerns of a social
movement can assist in the political development of that movement. In
Wanrow, a jury convicted Yvonne Wanrow, a Native American woman,
of second-degree murder for shooting and killing a white man named
William Wesler, whom she believed had tried to molest one of her chil-
dren.72 Wesler had entered her babysitter's home uninvited when
Wanrow and her children were there. Wanrow, who had a cast on her
leg and was using crutches at the time, claimed that, based on her per-
ceptions of the danger created by Wesler, she had acted in self-defense. 73
The trial court, however, instructed the jury to consider only the circum-
stances "at or immediately before the killing" when evaluating the grav-
ity of the danger the defendant faced,74 even though Wanrow claimed
that she had information which led her to believe that Wesler had a his-
tory of child molestation and had previously tried to molest one of her
children. 75 The trial court also instructed the jury to apply the equal
force standard, whereby the person claiming self-defense can only re-
spond with force equal to that which the assailant uses. 76 Wesler had not
been carrying a gun.7 7
Center lawyers became involved in the case on appeal to the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. Reading the trial transcript, we realized that the
judge's instructions prevented the jury from considering Yvonne
Wanrow's state of mind, as shaped by her experiences and perspective as
a Native American woman, when she confronted this man. The jury had
not been presented with evidence concerning the lack of police protection
generally in such situations, the pervasiveness of violence against women
and children, the effect on Wanrow of her knowledge of Wesler as a child
molester, and Wanrow's belief that she could only defend herself with a
weapon. Moreover, the judge's instructions to the jury directed the jury
71 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). Nancy Steams and I were co-counsel in Wanrow
on appeal. For a fuller discussion of Wanrow, see Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Wo-
men: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623, 641-42 (1980);
Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Phys-
ical or Sexual Assault, 4 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 149, 156-58 (1978); Recent Developments, 54
Wash. L. Rev. 221 (1978); MacKinnon, Book Review, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 725-34 (1982).
72 Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 224-26, 559 P.2d at 550-51.
73 Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
74 Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
75 Id. at 225-26, 559 P.2d at 550-51.
76 Id. at 239-40, 559 P.2d at 558.
77 Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
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to apply the equal force standard and not to consider Wanrow's perspec-
tive when evaluating her claim of self-defense.78 Consequently, our deci-
sion to challenge the sex-bias in the law of self-defense-as reflected in
these instructions-was formed from the insight that Yvonne Wanrow's
perspective as a Native American woman had to be included in the
courtroom.
We developed the legal argument for women's "equal right to trial,"
which challenged sex-bias in the law of self-defense, based upon our
knowledge of the particular problems women who killed men faced in
the criminal justice system: the prevalence of homicides committed by
women in circumstances of male physical abuse or sexual assault; the
different circumstances in which men and women killed; myths and mis-
conceptions in the criminal justice system concerning women who kill as
"crazy"; the problems of domestic violence, physical abuse, and sexual
abuse of women and children; the physical and psychological barriers
that prevented women from feeling capable of defending themselves; and
stereotypes of women as unreasonable. If the jury did not understand
Yvonne Wanrow's experience and the way in which it shaped her con-
duct, it could not find her conduct to have been reasonable and therefore
an appropriate act of self-defense. Since the jury would not be able to
consider this defense, Wanrow, then, could not be treated fairly.
On appeal, Wanrow's conviction was reversed.79 A plurality of the
court voted to reverse on the ground that the trial court's instructions
violated Washington law in three ways. First, the instruction that lim-
ited the jury's consideration to the circumstances "at or immediately
before the killing" misconstrued Washington law.80 Properly construed,
state law allowed the jury to consider Wanrow's knowledge of the de-
ceased's reputation, prior aggressive behavior, and all other prior circum-
stances, even if that knowledge were acquired long before the killing.81
Second, the instruction concerning equal force misstated state law and
denied Wanrow equal protection:
The impression created-that a 5'4" woman with a cast on her leg and
using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a 62"
intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense, unless the
jury finds her determination of the degree of danger to be objectively
reasonable--constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law
and, in the context of this case, violates the respondent's right to equal
protection of the law. 82
78 Id. at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
79 Id. at 224, 559 P.2d at 548.
80 Id. at 234-36, 559 P.2d at 555-56.
81 Id. at 237-38, 559 P.2d at 557.
42 Id. at 240, 559 P.2d 558-59.
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Third, the trial court's instructions failed to direct the jury to consider
the reasonableness of Wanrow's act from Wanrow's perspective, or, in
other words, "seeing what [s]he sees and knowing what [s]he knows." 83
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed a standard of self-defense
based on the individual defendant's perception, as required by Washing-
ton law, and underscored the need for this standard by recognizing the
existence of sex-bias in the law of self-defense generally.
The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in
the light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those per-
ceptions which were the product of our nation's "long and unfortunate
history of sex-discrimination." ... Until such time as the effects of that
history are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that our self-de-
fense instructions afford women the right to have their conduct judged
in light of the individual physical handicaps which are the product of
sex discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the right of the individ-
ual woman involved to trial by the same rules which are applicable to
male defendants.84
Thus, the political insights into sex-bias in self-defense that could
help to explain Yvonne Wanrow's situation arose out of legal formula-
tion and argumentation. But the legal argument concerning the "equal
right to trial" grew out of a political analysis of sex discrimination that
the legal team shared, discussed, and applied to the particular case. The
legal argumentation brought together diverse strands of feminist analysis
and theory concerning sex-biased treatment of women in the criminal
justice system.
This legal argumentation reflected a perspective which feminist ac-
tivists and lawyers were beginning to express and share.85 Feminist writ-
ers were beginning to explore these issues as well. 86 Further, aspects of
this argument were asserted at the same time in other courts in different
cases.87 The rights formulation reflected the political analysis and activ-
ity of women's groups concerned with violence against women, the treat-
ment of women within the criminal justice system, and the work of
defense committees organizing around particular women defendant's
83 Id. at 238, 559 P.2d at 557 (citing State v. Dunning, 8 Wash. App. 340, 342, 506 P.2d
321, 322 (1973)).
84 Id. at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 559 (citation omitted).
85 See sources cited in Schneider & Jordan, supra note 71, at 151-53.
86 See S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will (1975); R. Langley & R. Levy, Wife Beating: The
Silent Crisis (1977); D. Martin, Battered Wives (1976).
87 See cases cited in Schneider & Jordan, supra note 71, at 149. "National attention on
women 'fighting back' first focused on the cases of Inez Garcia and Joan Little who had both
killed assailants following sexual assault." Id. (citing People v. Garcia, Cr. No. 4259 (Super.
Ct. Cal. 1977) and State v. Little, 74 Cr. No. 4176 (Super. Ct. N.C. 1975)).
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cases. It was a formulation which made sense to many women on an
experiential level.
In this sense, the legal formulation grew out of political analysis, but
it also pushed the political analysis forward. The particular legal focus
on sex-bias in the law of self-defense, and on the absence of a women's
perspective in the courtroom, clarified feminist analysis of the problems
facing women who kill. It explained why both women defendants and
lawyers representing them were more likely to claim insanity or impaired
mental state rather than assert self-defense. 88 The legal formulation thus
moved the political work to a different level. It raised the political ques-
tion of what a woman's perspective might be and what equal treatment
would look like. It focused further legal work on the disparate hurdles
that limited women defendants' choice of defense-particularly the vari-
ous ways in which women's experiences were excluded from the
courtoom-and laid the foundation for political and legal strategies to
remedy the problems created by this exclusion.
What has become known as women's self-defense work is now an
established part of both feminist litigation and legal literature. 89 Many
courts have now accepted the view that there is sex-bias in the law of self-
defense.90 Still, the ongoing legal work in this area teaches us new les-
sons. It demonstrates the difficulty courts have in hearing women's ex-
periences and modifying the law to take them into account. Some courts
which have applied the insight reflected in the equal trial argument have
unwittingly recreated the very sex stereotypes of female incapacity that
women's self-defense work was intended to overcome. 91 But these new
8 See Schneider, supra note 71, at 636-38; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 71, at 159-60.
99 There is an enormous legal literature on women's self-defense issues. See, e.g., A. Jones,
Women Who Kill (1980); Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 121 (1985); Robinson, Defense Strategies for Bat-
tered Women who Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, 4 Harv. Women's L.J. 161 (1981);
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered
Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 11 (1986); Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-
Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1982); Comment, The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77
Nw. U.L. Rev. 348 (1982); Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in the Defense of Battered
Women, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 587 (1981); sources cited in note 71 supra.
90 See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (holding trial court committed revers-
ible error in excluding testimony concerning battered wife syndrome); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J.
178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (holding battered women's syndrome to be relevant to honesty and
reasonableness of defendant's belief of imminent danger and exclusion of testimony concerning
it required reversal and remand for new trial).
91 1 have argued elsewhere that the development and judicial acceptance of battered
woman syndrome reveals important tensions in feminist theory and practice concerning
themes of women's victimization and agency. See Schneider, Describing and Changing: Wo-
men's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts.
L. Rep. (forthcoming 1987).
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dilemmas of feminist theory can also help to clarify issues, sharpen de-
bate, and deepen insight into these matters.
Wanrow exemplifies the way in which the legal formulation of rights
emerging from political analysis and practice can be expressive. It dem-
onstrates the way a fights claim initially flows from political analysis and
then becomes the basis for a more self-reflective political analysis. The
rights formulation is part of an ongoing process of politics. The rights
claim is a "moment" in that process in which the political vision emerges
from within the claim of rights.
The Center's work in Wanrow, as in many other cases, was an exam-
ple of feminist theory in practice-of what lawmaking as praxis is like.
The legal theory emerged from political experience; the legal theory in
turn served to refine and sharpen political insights and to clarify tensions
in the political struggle; the political struggle was reassessed in light of
the legal theory; and, finally, experience reshaped the legal theory. In
short, the rights claims grew out of politics and then turned into politics.
This experience of praxis, then, provides a framework for my analysis of
rights and politics.
III
TOWARDS A DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF RIGHTS
AND POLITICS
The dialectical methodology detailed in the previous section sug-
gests that rights discourse and politics can be understood as intercon-
nected, even though they may appear at times to be in opposition. The
rights claim can emerge from a political vision and the rights claim can
be a form of political statement. Further, rights discourse can be a form
of praxis-a form of legal practice that can define and reshape the articu-
lation of theory.
As suggested earlier, recent rights critics have viewed the experience
of rights discourse and rights assertion in a static and rigid way.9 2 They
have accepted the opposition of rights and politics and the reification of
rights generally. A dialectical perspective, however, sees rights and poli-
tics as part of a more dynamic, complex, and larger process characterized
by the possibility that fights discourse can simultaneously advance and
obscure political growth and vision. A dialectical view of rights develops
the expressive, transformative, and problematic aspects of rights. It un-
derscores the idea that "[a]s much as rights are instruments of legitimiz-
ing oppression, they are also affirmations of human values.... [A]s often
as they are used to frustrate social movement, they are also among the
92 See text accompanying notes 19-36 supra.
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basic tools of social movement.193 Duncan Kennedy supports this dialec-
tical impulse when he suggests that "[e]mbedded in the rights notion is a
liberating accomplishment of our culture: the affirmation of free human
subjectivity against the constraints of group life, along with theparadoxi-
cal countervision of a group life that creates and nurtures individuals
capable of freedom."' 94 The recognition of paradox, of the seeming con-
tradiction of two opposites that are really interconnected, is critical to
the dialectical perspective I am suggesting.
Recent rights critics have emphasized appropriate caution concern-
ing the use of rights discourse to further political struggle.95 However,
the limits of rights discourse have been so emphasized because rights
have not been understood as part of a larger process, as a forum for poli-
tics, and as a stage within the development of political movements gener-
ally. True, there is always a risk that a political struggle will be so fixed
on rights discourse or winning rights in courts that it will not move be-
yond rights96 and will freeze political debate and growth. Rights dis-
course can be an alienated and artificial language that constricts political
debate. But it can also be a means to articulate new values and political
vision. The way in which a social movement group uses the fights claim
and places it in a broader context affects the ability of rights discourse to
aid political struggle. Rights discourse and rights claims, when emerging
from and organically linked to political struggle, can help to develop
political consciousness which can play a useful role in the development of
a social movement.
Rights discourse can express human and communal values; it can be
a way for individuals to develop a sense of self and for a group to develop
a collective identity. Rights discourse can also have a dimension that
emphasizes the interdependence of autonomy and community. 97 It can
play an important role in giving individuals a sense of self-definition,98 in
connecting the individual to a larger group and community,99 and in de-
fining the goals of a political struggle, particularly during the early devel-
03 Sparer, supra note 7, at 555.
94 Kennedy, supra note 28, at 506 (emphasis added).
95 See text accompanying notes 30-44 supra.
96 Gabel and Harris suggest that "a rights-oriented legal practice... does not address itself
to a central precondition for building a sustained political movement-that of overcoming the
psychological conditions upon which both the power of the legal system and the power of
social hierarchy in general rest." Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 375. They argue that "an
excessive preoccupation with 'rights consciousness' tends in the long run to reinforce aliena-
tion and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights inherently affirms that the source of social
power resides in the State rather than in the people themselves." Id.
97 See text accompanying notes 104-71 infra.
9S See text accompanying notes 113-41 infra.
99 See text accompanying notes 113-71 infra.
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opment of a social movement. 1°°
My effort to detail these affirmative dimensions of rights discourse
owes much to the many rights theorists who are engaged in similar ef-
forts to reimagine rights. For example, Ed Sparer's work on rights is
grounded in a dialectical understanding of the relationship between
rights and political struggle, theory and practice, and autonomy and
community.101 Sparer forcefully articulates the dual potential of rights
to both impede and advance political struggle. He challenges legal theo-
rists to move beyond a dichotomized conception of rights and politics. 102
He urges us to look closely at the political and social context in which
rights are asserted in order to evaluate the role that rights can play in
performing politicizing and consciousness-raising functions for a social
movement. 103
A. Communal Rights
Although it has been argued that rights are inherently individualis-
tic because individuals can "possess" them, 1°4 rights need not be per-
ceived this way. Staughton Lynd, for example, has developed the idea of
rights as "communal," infused with the values of community, compas-
sion, and solidarity. 10 5 Although he focuses on some rights as particu-
larly communal, 10 6 he argues in favor of fighting for the communal
100 See text accompanying notes 172-76 infra.
101 Sparer's work in this area parallels important insights of feminist theory. For example,
Sparer notes that "[c]entral to the argument I have made thus far is the notion that individual
autonomy and community are not contradictions at all; rather, they shape and give meaning
and richness to each other." Sparer, supra note 7, at 547. His work also reflects a feminist
self-reflective dialectical method-he starts with his own experience, extrapolates from it, and
turns back again to it. For example, Sparer discusses his experience with rights as a member of
the Communist Party and how that experience shaped his view that rights are a protection
against totalitarianism. Id. at 539-47.
102 My contention is: The notion of "legal right" is one which can affirm and defend human
autonomy and solidarity or merely give the appearance of such autonomy and solidarity
while in fact excusing oppression. Various kinds of legal rights and entitlements may be
used in a manner that helps to develop social movement, which in turn leads to ex-
panded opportunities for a more humane society, or they may be used to help frustrate
social movement by legitimizing existing relationships. The meaning of a right or enti-
tlement depends upon the way in which it intertwines with social movement.
Id. at 560.
103 Id.
104 See Lynd, supra note 22, at 1418-19.
105 Id. at 1419. Staughton Lynd notes that the conventional view of rights "implicitly as-
sumes that the supply of rights is finite, and thus that 'right' is a scarce commodity. In this
view the assertion of one person's right is likely to impinge on and diminish the rights of
others." Id.
106 Lynd focuses on § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), see
Lynd, supra note 22, at 1423-30, and the first amendment to the United States Constitution,
see id. at 1430-35.
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content of as many rights as possible and challenging the zero-sum per-
spective on rights generally. 107 He looks to the historical context in
which a right develops as a primary force shaping the particular collec-
tive aspect of the right. The communal dimension of a claim of right
may differ depending on the social and political context in which the
right claim emerges and the way in which formulation of the right re-
flects a corresponding political vision. For example, Lynd's view of the
right to engage in collective activity under section 7 of the National La-
bor Relations Act as a paradigmatic communal right is based on his per-
ception of this right as "derived from the actual character of working-
class solidarity and accordingly a right that foreshadows a society in
which group life and individual self-realization mutually reinforce each
other."108 Lynd's understanding of the collective aspect of rights has sev-
eral dimensions. He maintains that a right developed in the context of a
social movement struggle may have a collective cast to it. 109 Further, the
exercise of rights by an individual can expand the ability of the larger
group to exercise their rights generally.110 Finally, Lynd suggests that
the concept of the inalienability of rights-that an individual cannot give
up a right because it belongs to the group-is premised on an underlying
assumption based on the communal aspect of rights."' Lynd's analysis,
then, provides a framework to challenge the notion that rights claims
must necessarily be articulated and perceived as the property of rights-
bearing individuals.112
B. Individual Seflood and Collective Identity
Another aspect of a dialectical view of rights is the role that rights
discourse can play for individual self-development and collective identity.
Carol Gilligan's work in charting differences between male and female
moral and psychological development provides a basis for exploring this
107 See Lynd, supra note 22, at 1423. Lynd argues that
rights do not come neatly divided into inherently individual and inherently communal
rights. Most rights are sufficiently ambiguous that they can be pushed in different direc-
tions by political and intellectual struggles. Thus, the point may be less to identify and
champion peculiarly communal rights than to fight for communal content in as many
rights as possible.
Id. at 1422.
108 Id. at 1430.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 1427-28.
III See id. at 1441.
112 Lynd has recently developed these ideas more fully in the context of a community right
to industrial property. See S. Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right to Indus-
trial Property In Youngstown and Pittsburgh, 1977-1986 (1987) (unpublished manuscript on
file at New York Univeristy Law Review).
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issue.1 13 Gilligan's work suggests that these differences can shape the
way that individuals experience rights.
Gilligan's research focused on interviews with women considering
abortion, a study of female and male college students, and a study of age-
matched males and females at nine points in the life cycle.114 Listening
to the voices of the women she interviewed, Gilligan heard a morality
based on responsibility, connection, and caretaking, rather than separa-
tion.115 She heard a "different voice" which she linked to gender.1 6
Based on this research, Gilligan posited that there are different paths to
maturity which are roughly tied to gender. During development, men
emphasize individuation and autonomy. Women, on the other hand, em-
phasize caretaking and connection with others.' 1 7
Gilligan suggests that at an early stage of development men will
more likely seek to resolve moral dilemmas and conflict through the use
of rights. 1 8 She sees rights as abstract, formal, and hierarchical, and as a
means of resolving problems through an emphasis on separation and the
individual.1 19 Women's morality of care and responsibility differs from
the male model because it emphasizes context, connection, and relation-
ship.120 In this morality, problems are resolved, in what Gilligan calls a
"web"-like manner, by considering all the people involved in the situa-
tion and the connections between them.12' Gilligan believes this ap-
proach challenges the "premise of separation"' 22 underlying the notion
of rights. She sees these two approaches as not simply different from, but
potentially threatening to, one another. 2 3
113 C. Gilligan, supra note 39.
114 See id. at 2-3.
115 See id. at 19-21.
116 See id. at 2. However, Gilligan notes:
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but by theme. Its associa-
tion with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through women's voices
that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute, and the contrasts be-
tween male and female voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two
modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a
generalization about either sex.
Id. Gilligan's more recent comments suggest that the two modes of thought may not be explic-
itly linked to gender. See Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 48. Nonetheless, Gilligan's
work has been widely seen as linking these two perspectives to gender. See, e.g., Broughton,
Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory
of Moral Development, 50 Soc. Res. 597 (1983).
117 See C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 18, 22.
118 See id. at 19-22.
119 See id. at 32. Kenneth Karst describes this means of resolving problems as "ladder"-
like. Karst, supra note 57, at 462 (citing C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 62).
120 See C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 173.
121 See id. at 28, 38, 54, 57.
122 Id. at 57.
123 See id. at 22.
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Gilligan posits that the developmental challenges of maturity are
different for men and women. Men, whose lives have emphasized sepa-
rateness, must ultimately learn care and connection. 124 Women, whose
lives have emphasized connection to and caretaking for others, must ulti-
mately learn to value and care for themselves. 125 Mature moral and psy-
chological development for both sexes would seek to synthesize moral
perspectives based on both rights and responsibilities.1 26
For this reason, Gilligan suggests that the assertion of rights can
play a particularly important role in women's moral development.
27
She suggests that women's articulation of rights challenges women's
sense of self and transforms women's experience of selflessness. "[T]he
essential notion of rights [is] that the interests of the self can be consid-
ered legitimate. In this sense, the concept of rights changes women's
conceptions of self, allowing them to see themselves as stronger and to
consider directly their own needs." 128
Gilligan's description of this psychological process of moral rights
assertion has several facets. It allows women to consider their own needs
directly and care for themselves, not just care for others. 129 But instead
of resting on an individually centered, hierarchically based concept of
rights, rights assertion in this context takes on a different character and
moves beyond a formal "paralyzing injunction not to hurt others."' 30
Gilligan describes it in the following way.
Thus, changes in women's rights change women's moral judg-
ments, seasoning mercy with justice by enabling women to consider it
moral to care not only for others but for themselves. The issue of in-
clusion first raised by the feminists in the public domain reverberates
through the psychology of women as they begin to notice their own
exclusion of themselves. When the concern with care extends from an
injunction not to hurt others to an ideal of responsibility in social rela-
tionships, women begin to see their understanding of relationships as a
source of moral strength. But the concept of rights also changes wo-
men's moral judgments by adding a second perspective to the consider-
ation of moral problems, with the result that judgment becomes more
tolerant and less absolute. 131
Gilligan outlines a process of moral development for women that
124 Id. at 38-39.
125 Id. at 39.
126 Id. at 166.
127 Wendy Williams helped me understand that I was affirmatively extending Gilligan's
insights concerning moral claims of rights to legal rights.
128 C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 149.
129 Id. at 149.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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moves from an emphasis on selflessness and care for others, 32 to a recog-
nition of self and autonomy,1 33 and then to a self-reflective understanding
of the way in which self and other are interconnected.134 She suggests
that assertion of rights, particularly women's rights, can play a crucial
role in the transformation of women's sense of self.135 Public assertion of
women's legal rights reverberates in the consciousness of individual wo-
men.136 This process of differentiation through women's assertion of
their own rights provides a basis for women to distinguish self from
other. This enables women to exercise genuine responsibility, while at
the same time, because people can "experience relationship only insofar
as we differentiate other from self,"137 to recognize the interrelationship
of self and other. Gilligan suggests that, in this way, assertion of rights
for women in the context of women's morality of caretaking and respon-
sibility can transform and enhance women's moral development.
Gilligan also suggests a further transformative dimension of wo-
men's experience with rights. She implies that assertion of women's
rights can provide women with a sense of collective identity, a sense that
self and other are connected. 138 For women, the assertion of rights re-
places a hierarchy of rights with a web-like understanding of responsibil-
ity in relationships that "changes an order of inequality into a structure
of interconnection."1 39 Assertion of rights by women can thus change the
rights experience itself. She suggests that rights shaped by the values of
the web can transform the process by which rights are asserted and the
way they are experienced.
Gilligan's suggestion that the psychological experience and social
function of rights assertion may perform different developmental tasks
for men and women may be overbroad in its link to gender. 40 But the
132 See id. at 64-66 ("the moral person is one who helps others; goodness is service").
133 See id. at 70-71, 82-83.
134 See id. at 127 ("the realization that self and other are interdependent and that life ...
can only be sustained by care in relationships").
135 See id. at 128-29.
136 Id. at 149-50.
137 Id. at 63.
138 Describing the experience of a woman she interviewed, Gilligan writes:
Now, however, she sees the limitation of the "individually-centered" approach of bal-
ancing rights and claims in the failure of this approach to take into account the reality of
relationships, "a whole other dimension to human experience." In seeing individual
lives as connected and embedded in a social context of relationship, she expands her
moral perspective to encompass a notion of "collective life." Responsibility now includes
both self and other, viewed as different but connected rather than as separate and opposed.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 62.
140 While Gilligan's work is powerful and rich, and her characterizations feel subjectively
accurate in many ways, In a Different Voice is also troubling. See On In A Different Voice:
An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 304 (1986). A conversation
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sense of self-definition and collective identification that Gilligan details is,
nevertheless, an important apsect of rights claims. Gilligan expressly
links public assertion of legal rights to psychological and moral develop-
ment. Rights can be an essential way of understanding and experiencing
"self-in-other," a foundation for selfhood,14' and can be critical to the
growth and development of any movement, particularly at its early
stages. The assertion of rights claim and the use of rights discourse may
thus not be purely individual-it can link the individual to a broader
with Rhonda Copelon increased my understanding of this. Although Gilligan says that the
different voices are not always linked to gender, she makes gender-based assumptions without
sufficient emphasis and analysis of the complex factors shaping gender. For example, Gilli-
gan's work has been criticized for its insensitivity to race and class differences, and its disre-
gard of historical context. See Nicholson, Women, Morality and History, 59 Soc. Res. 514,
530-33 (1983); O'Loughlin, Responsibility and Moral Maturity in the Control of Fertility-
Or, a Woman's Place is in the Wrong, 50 Soc. Res. 556, 570-72 (1983); Tavris, Women and
Men and Morality, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 32. It has also been
criticized for a failure to analyze the social and political context of the spheres in which wo-
men's care-based approach develops. See, e.g., Colby & Damon, Listening to a Different
Voice: A Review of Gilligan's In a Different Voice, 29 Merrill-Palmer Q. 473, 476 (1983);
Walker, In a Diffident Voice: Cryptoseparatist Analysis of Female Moral Development, 50
Soc. Res. 665, 690-94 (1983); Reardon, Book Review, 84 Tchrs. C. Rec. 966, 968 (1983);
Squier & Ruddick, Book Review, 53 Harv. Educ. Rev. 338, 341 (1983). Gilligan also fails to
identify properly the problem of self-sacrifice when women emphasize caretaking for others
without recognizing their own autonomy and needs. See, e.g., Benjamin, Book Review, 9
Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 297, 298 (1983); Squier & Ruddick, supra, at 341.
Indeed, Catherine MacKinnon has observed that Gilligan's "different voice" may be the
voice of the victim.
[I]t makes a lot of sense that women might have a somewhat distinctive perspective on
social life. We may or may not speak in a different voice-I think that the voice that we
have been said to speak in is in fact in large part the "feminine" voice, the voice of the
victim speaking without consciousness. But when we understand that women are forced
into this situation of inequality, it makes a lot of sense that we should ... want to urge
values of care, because it is what we have been valued for. We have had little choice but
to be valued this way. It sure would be nice if somebody would care for us .... It
makes a lot of sense that women should claim our identity in relationships because we
have not been allowed to have a social identity on our own terms.
Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 27 (emphasis in original); see also Lloyd, Reason, Gen-
der and Morality in the History of Philosophy, 50 Soc. Res. 490, 512-13 (1983) (women's
voices must be understood in context of fundamental inequality; voice heard may be voice of
the suppressed.). For these reasons, although Gilligan's characterizations based on gender
confirm common perceptions, affirm women's experience, and validate a woman-centered per-
spective, see, e.g., Karst, supra note 57, at 481-86; Douvan, Book Review, 28 Contemp. Psy-
chology 261, 261-62 (1983); Reardon, supra, at 967, their roughness is still troubling, see, e.g.,
Nails, Social Scientific Sexism: Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man, 50 Soc. Res. 643, 662-64 (1983).
For my purposes, however, the significant aspect of her work is her insight into the way in
which rights claims can be an aspect of psychological and social transformation-a moment in
a dialectical process of change-and the way in which rights claims asserted as part of that
process might be different. See C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 147.
141 F. Michelman, supra note 3, at 27. Michelman suggests that "rights can be understood
as the institutionally embodied form of the mirroring of self-in-other that both Hegelian phi-
losophy and psychological theory see as the foundation of self-hood." Id.
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social group. In this sense, rights discourse can play a role in tran-
scending the dichotomy of individual and community.
C. Interdependent Rights
Gilligan implies that the gender-linked oppositions of rights and
care-based morality can be transcended in dialectical fashion in a third
stage of development in which both men and women see the importance
and interconnection of rights and responsibilities. 142 She also suggests
that rights discourse in this third stage, modified by what she perceives as
characteristically female concerns regarding context, care, and connec-
tion, might be different. 143
Gilligan imagines that this third stage of development will be based
upon the synthesis of male and female voices-those of rights and re-
sponsibilities. 144 She suggests that if you include both voices, you will
142 See C. Gilligan, supra note 39, at 174. Gilligan uses the term dialectic to describe the
process of human development. "To understand how the tension between responsibilities and
rights sustains the dialectic of human development is to see the integrity of two disparate
modes of experience that are in the end connected." Id.
143 Id. at 164-66; see Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 47-49 (comments by C.
Gilligan).
144 See Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 35. Gilligan explains how this synthesis might
work:
This is what I mean by two voices, two ways of speaking. One voice speaks about
equality, reciprocity, fairness, rights; one voice speaks about connection, not hurting,
care, and response. My point is that these voices are in tension with each other. In my
work, I have attempted to ask, "What does it mean to include both voices in defining the
domain of morality, of humanity, and so forth?" I want to give one example that illus-
trates well what I think it means, and what this inclusion implies. I do not think it
implies a simple addition, a kind of separate-but-equal thing or an androgynous solution.
I think it implies a transformation in thinking.
The best way I can illustrate this is through an example provided by two four-year-
olds who were playing together and wanted to play different games. The girl said: "Let's
play next-door neighbors." The boy said: "I want to play pirates." "Okay," said the
girl, "then you can be the pirate who lives next door." She has reached what I would
call an inclusive solution rather than a fair solution-the fair solution would be to take
turns and play each game for an equal period. "First we will play pirates for ten minutes
and then we will play neighbors for ten minutes." Each child would enter the other's
imaginative world. The girl would learn about the world of pirates and the boy would
learn about the world of neighbors. It is a kind of tourism on a four-year-old's level.
Really, it's simple. But the interesting thing is that neither game would change-the
pirate game would stay the pirate game, and the neighbor game would stay the neighbor
game. Both children would learn both games, hopefully for an equal period of time. It
is what is called "androgyny."
Now look what happens in the other solution, what I would call the inclusive
solution. By bringing a pirate into the neighborhood, both the pirate game and the
neighbor game change. In addition, the pirate-neighbor game, the combined game, is a
game that neither child had separately imagined. In other words, a new game arises
through the relationship.
That is basically my point: The inclusion of two voices in moral discourse, in think-
ing about conflicts, and in making choices, transforms the discourse. It is no longer
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transform the very nature of the conversation; 45 the discourse is no
longer either simply about justice or simply about caring; rather it is
about bringing them together to transform the domain. 146 Although
feminist scholars have questioned whether this third stage is really trans-
formative, 147 Gilligan's vision of rights articulated in this different voice
has stimulated attempts by legal scholars to reimagine rights1 48 and to
conceive of them as "interdependent".
For example, in a number of recent articles Martha Minow has
sought an understanding of rights that resolves the tension between au-
tonomy and caretaking.149 She explores reconstructive visions of rights
shaped by a "conception of self... [that locates] each individual within
social networks [where] membership helps constitute the 'I,' and belong-
ing is essential to becoming."' 150 Minow attempts to redefine the sub-
stance of purportedly individualistic rights by positing a right to
connection, by developing the interconnection of rights and responsibili-
ties, and by suggesting that rights claims can focus on the social and
either simply about justice or simply about caring; rather, it is about bringing them
together to transform the domain. We are into a new game whose parameters have not
been spelled out, whose values are not very well known. We are at the beginning of a
process of inquiry, in which the methods themselves will have to be re-examined because
the old methods were from the old game.
Id. at 44-45 (emphasis in original).
145 See id. at 45.
146 See id.
147 Commentators have noted that the premise of Gilligan's third stage is that there can be a
dialogue or conversation between the different voices. This premise may be unrealistic and
overly romanticized if men cannot hear women's voices and tend to universalize based on their
own particular experience. For example, Kathy Ferguson criticizes Gilligan's analysis of a
different voice for its lack of political context. She also criticizes Gilligan's analysis of the third
stage of development for its failure to emphasize the degree to which it rests on political strug-
gle. K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 169-70. Kathleen Lahey has told me that she questions
whether this third stage involves a conversation in which there is genuine mutuality.
148 Gilligan's work has also influenced legal scholars concerned with reimagining rights
generally. See Karst, supra note 57; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specula-
tions on a Woman's Lawyering Process, I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985); Rifkin, Mediation
from a Feminist Perspective: Promise & Problems, 2 Law & Inequality: J. Theory & Prac. 21
(1984); Spiegelmen, supra note 57. Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that women's forms of
lawyering might have aspects which mirror Gilligan's web-such as a broader use of problem-
solving forms (such as mediation and negotiation) rather than rights. See Menkel-Meadow,
supra, at 50-63. Kenneth Karst has suggested that the substance of web-like rights might
differ from a more traditional conception of rights because of its focus on access, participation,
and continuity. See Karst, supra note 57, at 490-95.
149 See Minow, Book Review, 13 Reviews in American History 240 (1985); Minow, Book
Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1084 (1985); Minow, Book Review, 53 Harv. Educ. Rev. 444 (1983).
150 Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows": Towards a History of Family
Law, 1985 Wisc. L. Rev. 819, 894 (footnote omitted); see also Note, Reinterpreting the Relig-
ion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and the Conceptions of the Self, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1468, 1471-73 (1984) (proposing alternative conception of human identity encompassing both
separateness of self and its connection to others).
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economic preconditions for rights. 151
William Simon's recent article on welfare rights, 152 which contrasts
the New Deal social work jurisprudence of welfare rights with the con-
temporary New Property conception of rights, suggests a similar per-
spective that he calls "regenerative."' 153 Simon sees the New Property
conception of rights as reincarnating classical legalist views of rights
based on the protection of individual independence and self-sufficiency
from the collective power of the state.' 54 In contrast, he suggests that
rights in New Deal social work jurisprudence differed from the classical
model because they challenged this distinction between the individual
and the community and reflected a norm of interdependence. 155 Rights
were used as part of a dialectical process of political development and a
means of education for the welfare claimant. Rights claims were a means
by which people on welfare came to understand their goals and a way for
the individual claimant to get involved in political activity, to have
greater participation in the process of decisionmaking, and to have a
more articulate understanding of her interests.
156
Rights in this context became a way to have a dialogue, a conversa-
tion; they "facilitated the beginning and middle as well as the conclusion
of analysis." 157 In contrast with classical liberal conceptions of rights,
this conception implicated collective concerns and reflected the "social or
communal dimension of the self and of legal entitlement."' 58 Rights
claims were made "for" something, not only against others and the
state. 159 Simon's description implies that the process by which the rights
claims were developed and articulated and the interdependent content of
the rights might be related. It suggests that the communal dimension of
the right helped to shape the role that rights played for the welfare claim-
ant and the rights-enforcing social worker.
Kenneth Karst's effort to reconstruct constitutional law as a "juris-
prudence of interdependence" 160 is similarly premised on Gilligan's
151 See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights,
9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 24 (1986).
152 Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
153 Id. at 16.
154 See id. at 23.
155 See id. at 14-15.
156 See id. at 17-18.
157 Id. at 15.
158 Id. at 13.
159 Id. at 17. In this sense, although a principal argument against the use of rights discourse
is that it sets up an adversarial model of interests, the message of a rights claim may, neverthe-
less, be overwhelmingly affirmative.
160 Karst, supra note 57, at 495. Karst suggests that the existing language of rights, equal-
ity, and autonomy does not adequately "express the active mutual responsibility and care that
are central to the morality of the web." Id. at 504.
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work. 161 Karst accepts Gilligan's dichotomy of rights and care-based
systems of moral development as fundamentally male and female, and he
uses this opposition as a framework to reimagine constitutional law and
litigation. Karst seems to accept the notion of rights as historically hier-
archical and individualistic, but he wants to synthesize rights with care
so as to develop "a conception of justice that recognize[s] our
interdependence." 16 2 He understands, though, that concepts of rights
and the language of rights will still be necessary to further this process,
albeit as an interim measure. 163 As such, he seeks to infuse rights-talk
with the values of the web, and to modify rights-dominated constitu-
tional litigation to take greater account of the morality of care. 164
Karst seeks to synthesize these perspectives by looking for ways in
which the male experience of rights can be creatively "feminized" and
modified in litigation.165 He suggests that legal argumentation should
include a broader social, institutional, and political perspective; 66 a
closer focus on the particular human context of a case;' 67 the use of intui-
tion and experience as the basis for the articulation of rights;168 and the
use of vocabulary which particularizes and names experience.1 69 Signifi-
cantly for the next section of this Article, he observes that this may be
particularly possible in the area of sex-discrimination litigation.170
The notions of interdependent rights that these various theorists
have envisioned are efforts to redefine the substance of rights claims and
the process of rights assertion so as to modify and transform the individ-
ualistic dimensions of rights. They are efforts to reimagine rights shaped
by a vision of self which Gilligan posits as female-a sense of self based
161 See id. at 461.
162 Id. at 471.
163 See id. at 505-06.
164 See id. at 506.
165 See id. at 504-05. Paul Spiegelman sees the task of infusing the legal system with the
morality of the web as difficult. He suggests that "[t]he options for those who wish insights
from the web to be effective are either to transform the system so that it speaks the language of
the web or to translate those insights into the vocabulary of the ladder." Spiegelman, supra
note 57, at 424.
166 See Karst, supra note 57, at 495-503.
167 See id.
16s See id. at 500-02.
169 See id. at 503-08.
170 Karst suggests that this modification of rights with the language of the web might occur
first in the field of sex discrimination.
In the field of sex discrimination itself, we might even expect constitutional law to
develop at a rate that outpaces the progress of consciousness-raising among women gen-
erally. The women who will directly influence the growth of constitutional doctrine will
be professionals and policymakers-a relatively small group of women who are the most
likely to be conscious of the harms caused by the traditional construct of femininity.
Id. at 507 n.230.
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upon connection instead of separation or distance. These views of inter-
dependent rights emphasize the ability of rights discourse to express
human values and affirm the creative, expressive, and connective pos-
sibilities of rights.
D. Rights as Conversation
The theoretical efforts discussed above focused on the way that
rights connected to political struggle can be part of an ongoing conversa-
tion and can have a character, content, and meaning that is more com-
munal because they reflect the very political struggle from which they
emerged. This political context might affect both the process by which
rights are articulated 17' as well as the content of the rights themselves:
what the rights mean to individuals and members of the group who claim
them at a particular time, and how they are understood and experienced
at that time. However, even if rights discourse is understood as part of a
process of political education and mobilization, how do we ensure that
the articulation of rights claims will truly assist in that larger process?
How can we be sure that if rights discourse starts the conversation of
politics, the conversation will ever move beyond rights? 172 We must take
seriously Peter Gabel's caution that rights can substitute the illusion of
community for a more authentic and genuine sense of community. 73 A
preoccupation with or excessive focus on rights consciousness can rein-
force alienation or powerlessness and weaken the power of popular
movements.174 In and of themselves, rights claims are not a basis for
building a sustained political movement, nor can rights claims perform
the task of social reconstruction. Still, their importance should not be
underestimated. Articulation of political insight in rights terms can be
an important vehicle for political growth, and can help develop a sense of
collective identity.
If rights claims can provide a sense of selfhood and collective iden-
tity and start political conversation, a series of questions should be raised
to help guide our evaluation of the use of rights claims in a given context.
Does the use of legal struggle generally and rights discourse in particular
help build a social movement? Does articulating a right advance political
171 I do not directly address the fact that rights formulations-at least those used in legal
fora-set up a contest between competing rights, and are in that sense hierarchical or, as Karst
puts it, the mode of the ladder. Id. at 462. The development of a jurisprudence of
interdependence might infuse the values of the web into the substance of the law, by develop-
ing rights of access, participation, and continuity, but can it also modify the process by which
competing claims of rights might be resolved? See id. at 495; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 148,
at 54-55.
172 See J. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal System 233 (1978).
173 See Gabel, supra note 19, at 1577.
174 Gabel & Harris, supra note 19, at 375-76.
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organizing and assist in political education? Can a right be articulated in
a way that is consistent with the politics of an issue or that helps redefine
it? Does the transformation of political insight into legal argumentation
capture the political visions that underlie the movement? Does the use of
rights keep us in touch with or divert us from consideration of and strug-
gle around the hard questions of political choice and strategy? Does it
keep the movement passive or help it begin to act? Does it help the
movement to determine what it really wants? Does it limit or constrain
the movement's vision of what might be possible?175 These questions will
shape our inquiry as we examine the women's rights experience.
IV
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND FEMINIST STRUGGLE
Recent experience with claims of legal rights for women suggests the
importance of understanding the relationship between rights and polit-
ical struggle from a dialectical perspective. This experience demonstrates
the richly textured process by which a social movement group articulates
political demands through a rights claim and the way in which that claim
affects the development of the group. 176 Most significantly, the experi-
175 Ed Sparer notes that although it is critical to link theory with social movement practice,
reform efforts are risky because "the reform theorist or practitioner undergoes the risk of de-
veloping a theory to promote not a 'transformative' reform but a 'coopting reform'--one in
which the reformer helps sustain the belief system which supports what is wrong in the
world." Sparer, supra note 7, at 566.
176 In this section, I begin to explore the relationships between a jurisprudential perspective
on legal rights, the way in which social movement groups experience rights, and the role that
rights can play in political development. It is a preliminary and speculative effort and, in a
sense, an outline for further work. David Trubek's comments on this section, and his insights
into the various levels of analysis that I am seeking to integrate here, were most helpful. I
share his view that legal scholars must go beyond the analysis of legal doctrine and legal theory
and look at the impact that law has on social groups. See Trubek, supra note 20, at 567. I
have included this section out of a commitment to begin this inquiry. It is important to start to
ask questions about the interrelationship of legal theory and social movement practice, even if
one cannot give answers.
My sources for the analysis set forth in this section are based primarily on my own obser-
vations, discussions with other women's rights lawyers and feminist activists, and participation
in a wide range of feminist legal activities over the last fifteen years. I have also looked to a
developing literature analyzing the impact of the women's rights movement. See, e.g., M.
Berger, Litigation on Behalf of Women (1980); N. McGlen & K. O'Connor, Women's Rights:
The Struggle for Equality in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1983); K. O'Connor,
Women's Organizations' Use of the Courts (1980); Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litiga-
tion: An Examination of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project 1971-
1976, 8 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 373 (1976); McGlen & O'Connor, An Analysis of the U.S.
Women's Rights Movements: Rights as a Public Good, 1 Women & Pol. 65 (1980); O'Connor
& Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying: Women's Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67
Judicature 134 (1983) [hereinafter O'Connor & Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying];
O'Connor & Epstein, Sex and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of Support for Gender-Based
Claims, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 327 (1983). While the empirical basis for my discussion is incomplete
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ence of the women's rights movement simultaneously reveals the com-
munal possibilities of rights and underscores the limits of political
strategy focused on rights. This part briefly examines four areas of
women's rights work which highlight this experience: equality, reproduc-
tive rights, sexual harassment, and legal treatment of battered women.
Historically, the feminist movement in this country has focused on
notions of rights. 177 In 1848, the women's rights convention at Seneca
Falls issued a Declaration of Sentiments and passed resolutions which set
forth a platform on women's rights.1 78 The first wave of feminism in the
nineteenth century sought to enhance women's access to political and
economic opportunity by challenging laws that denied women the right
to vote and barred them from various occupations. 179 For example, the
struggle to win passage of the nineteenth amendment emphasized the im-
portance for women of the right to vote.' 80 Rights claims grew out of
early feminists' political analyses which saw women's exclusion from
public and political life as central to their continued subordination.',,
Spurred by the explosion of feminist consciousness in the 1960s, wo-
men's rights have been claimed in a variety of contexts, focusing primar-
ily on issues of equality-the right to equal treatment and the right to
reproductive choice. The reemerging women's rights movement has also
led to new understandings of women's legal oppression in such areas as
sexual harassment and the treatment of battered women. Claims of
rights and use of the language of rights have affected both public dis-
course and individual consciousness, and suggest the possibilities and
limits of rights discourse.
A. Rights Claims and Discourse in the Women's Movement
Over the last twenty years, claims for women's rights have increas-
ingly been used to articulate political demand for equality and for change
in gender roles. A claim of right can make a political statement and
transmit a powerful message concerning "the kind of society we want to
by the standards of legal sociology, the perspectives it reflects are, I believe, commonly held, at
least by feminist lawyers who have been actively involved in litigation for the women's rights
movement.
177 Olsen, supra note 2, at 392; see id. at 393-400. McGlen and O'Connor have identified
three stages of women's rights activity in the United States: (1) the early women's rights move-
ment (1848-1875), (2) the Suffrage movement (1890-1925), and (3) the current women's rights
movement (1966-present). N. McGlen & K. O'Connor, supra note 176, at 2.
178 See N. McGlen & K. O'Connor, supra note 176, at 1-2.
179 Olsen, supra note 2, at 392; see N. McGlen & K. O'Connor, supra note 176, at 43-60,
149-64. My use of the phrase "first wave of feminism" collapses McGlen and O'Connor's first
two stages into one.
180 See generally E. Flexner, Century of Struggle (1968).
181 See Olsen, supra note 2, at 392.
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live in, the kind of relations among people we wish to foster, and the kind
of behavior that is to be praised or blamed. [It] is a moral claim about
how human beings should act toward one another." 18 2 As we have al-
ready seen, on an individual level, a claim of right can be an assertion of
one's self-worth and an affirmation of one's moral value and entitlement.
Claims of women's rights are "a way for a woman to make a claim about
herself and her role in the world."' 18 3
The women's rights movement has had an important affirming and
individuating effect on women's consciousness. The articulation of wo-
men's rights provides a sense of self and distinction for individual wo-
men, while at the same time giving women an important sense of
collective identity. Through this articulation, women's voices and con-
cerns are heard in a public forum and afforded a legal vehicle for
expression.
But rights claims do not only define women's individual and collec-
tive experience, they also actively shape public discourse. Claims of
equal rights and reproductive choice, for example, empowered women.
Women as a class had not previously been included within the reach of
the fourteenth amendment.'8 4 Women's concerns now rose to the level
of constitutional (serious, grown-up) concerns. By claiming rights, wo-
men asserted their intention to be taken seriously in society. This "lib-
eral" assertion of rights gave women the "audacity to compare"
themselves with men. 185 Women could now claim that they were entitled
to the equal protection of the law, not just permitted to seek it.186
12 Id. at 391.
183 Id.
114 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
185 MacKinnon, Excerpts from MacKinnon/Schlafly Debate, 1 Law & Inequality: J. The-
ory & Prac. 341, 342 (1983). MacKinnon notes, in analyzing the radical potential of feminism,
that
[Il]iberalism has been subversive for us in that it signals that we have the audacity to
compare ourselves with men, to measure ourselves by male standards, on male terms.
We do seek access to the male world. We do criticize our exclusion from male pursuits.
But liberalism limits us in a way feminism does not. We also criticize male pursuits,
from women's point of view, from the standpoint of our social experiences as women.
Id. at 342-43 (emphasis in original).
186 Olsen has suggested,
The claim that women have rights may be seen, however, simply as a way of assert-
ing that women should be allowed to do something; rights are merely the generic vehicle
for making such claims. From this perspective, one's inner experience of a right is noth-
ing more than the claim that one should be allowed to do a particular thing.
Olson, supra note 2, at 391 n.12. In contrast, Linda Gordon phrased the issue in conversation
with me as women's entitlement to relief from the state. The choice of words reflects a differ-
ence in perspective on whether rights claims have more potential for activation than pacifica-
tion. I agree that the inner experience of a right has the self-defining aspects that Olsen
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Women's interests, previously relegated to the private sphere, and there-
fore outside the public protection of the law, 187 now received the protec-
tion of the Constitution. 188 The claims reinforced on a powerful
ideological level that the "personal is political"' 189 and changed previ-
ously private concerns into public ones that needed to be dealt with by
the society at large.
The public nature of rights assertion is especially significant because
of the private nature of discrimination against women. The locus of wo-
men's subordination is frequently the private and individual sphere-the
home and family-and is thus perceived as isolated and experienced in
isolation. Women also tend to see individual fault rather than to identify
a systemic pattern of social discrimination. Thus, public claims of legal
rights do more than simply put women's sense of self into the personal
moral equation. 190 The assertion of rights claims and use of rights dis-
course help women to overcome this sense of privatization and of per-
sonal blame which has perpetuated women's subordination. Rights
claims and rights discourse have thus had a self-defining aspect as well as
a collective dimension because the inner experience of the right ties the
suggests, but I believe that this inner experience has a collective dimension as well. Rights
claims tie the individual experiences of a woman to the larger experience of women as a class.
187 Excluded in the past from the public sphere of marketplace and government, women
have been consigned to a private realm to carry on their primary responsibilities....
This separation of society into the male public sphere and the female private sphere was
most pronounced during the nineteenth century, when production moved out of the
home. But even today, women's opportunities in the public sphere are limited by their
obligations in the private domestic sphere.
Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in The Poli-
tics of Law: A Progressive Critique 117, 118 (D. Kairys ed. 1982)(footnote omitted); see also
Olsen, supra note 61, at 1498.
The law has been in large part absent from the private sphere and that absence has con-
tributed to male dominance and female subservience. Isolating women from the legal order
has denied women legal relief, but it also carries "an important ideological message to the rest
of society.... [T]he law's absence devalues women and their functions: women simply are not
sufficiently important to merit legal regulation." Taub & Schneider, supra, at 122.
The message of women's inferiority is compounded by the totality of the law's absence
from the private realm. In our society, law is for business and other important things.
The fact that the law in general has so little bearing on women's day-to-day concerns
reflects and underscores their insignificance. Thus, the legal order's overall contribution
to the devaluation of women is greater than the sum of the negative messages conveyed
by individual legal doctrines.
Id. at 123.
188 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that state criminal abortion laws
that prohibit certain classes of abortions without accounting for stage of pregnancy and other
interests violates fourteenth amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that pro-
vision of Idaho probate code which gives preference to men over women for appointment as
administrators of decedent's estate violates fourteenth amendment).
189 Z. Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 11; see text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
190 Wendy Williams framed the issue in this way for me.
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individual and her particular experiences to the larger experiences of wo-
men as a class. Rights claims assert women's selfhood collectively,
thereby giving women a sense of group identity and pride; they make
manifest the fact that women can act and claim their place in history.19'
Formulations of women's rights emerged from the women's move-
ment itself, from the experiences of women, and from feminist theory.
This integration of experience and theory reflected in rights claims was
heightened by the fact that at the same time notions of women's rights
were articulated, the number of women in the legal profession was in-
creasing dramatically. 192 Many of the women lawyers who have focused
on women's rights work entered law school because of the women's
movement or were drawn into the women's movement during law
school. These women, then, articulated rights claims in a dual capacity
as lawyers and as activists. Lawyering was not "other" to these women
but rather a deepening process of identification, self-reflection, and con-
nection with others (both women clients and lawyers), which mirrored
the experience of the movement itself.193 This made the experience of
l19l Kathy Ferguson underscores the importance for women of asserting rights as a means of
"active participation in public life." K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 174. Ellen DuBois also
emphasizes that "women act in history." Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 70 (emphasis
in original).
192
CATEGORY PERCENT OF TOTAL
1970 1983
Law Students 8.5 37.7
Supreme Court Clerks 3.0* 21.2
Lawyers 4.0 15.3
Law Professors 2.2 13.5
Judges 1.0 6.0
Sources: Law Students-1970: C. Epstein, Women in Law 53 (1981); 1983: Law School Ad-
mission Council/Law School Admission Services, 1985-1986 Prelaw Handbook: The Official
Guide to U.S. Law Schools 13 (1985). Supreme Court Clerks: *Cook, Women Judges: A
Preface to Their History, 14 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 573, 589 (1984)(3.0% figure given for
Supreme Court Clerks from 1971). Lawyers-1970: C. Epstein, supra, at 5; 1983: U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 49 (June 1985). Law
Professors-1970: C. Epstein, supra, at 219; 1983: Cook, supra, at 589. Judges-1970: Fos-
sum, Women in the Legal Profession: A Progress Report, 67 A.B.A. J. 578, 582 (1981); 1983:
Cook, supra, at 573.
193 Mary Dunlap explains it in this way, "As one reads, or as one perceives, feminist in-
volvement in law as an agenda, it is plain that such an agenda encompasses every realm of our
lives, every aspect of who we are, who we are becoming, and what our experiences are." Femi-
nist Discourse, supra note 57, at 14. Carrie Menkel-Meadow explores this issue as an aspect of
a woman's lawyering process. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 148, at 55-60. She agrees with
Catherine MacKinnon that the methodology of consciousness-raising "creates knowledge from
shared, collective experience" and suggests that this may affect the way that women practice
law. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). She gives an example from a colleague's brief-writing pro-
ject on a topic involving a matter of feminist jurisprudence, in which the colleague described
the brief-writing process as "communitarian and communicative, full of feeling and interper-
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lawyering in these cases particularly intense and powerful. It undoubt-
edly shaped the way in which women lawyers perceived legal problems,
the insights that women litigators brought to sex-discrimination cases,
and the strategies that women litigators developed to handle these cases.
Perhaps for this reason, women's rights litigation has involved sev-
eral important aspects of Karst's reconstructed constitutional litigation:
the use of experience and intuition as starting point and guide, the crea-
tive use of both political and social contexts, and the exploration of the
human impact and context of the case in concrete terms. Much women's
rights litigation has implemented a strategy which uses amicus curiae
briefs to present these broader perspectives to ensure that women's voices
are heard in court. 194 In this way, women's rights litigation has fre-
quently expanded the possibilities of creative political envisioning
through the use of rights discourse.195
It is sometimes difficult to remember how visionary the notion of
equality from a woman's perspective is-how much it really chal-
lenges. 196 Recent critiques of rights have suggested that rights rhetoric
inevitably abstracts and distances, but women's rights litigation has con-
cretized women's experience and emphasized women's specificity and
particularity. 197 Women's rights litigation began the process of shaping
sonal experience." Id. at 56 (footnote omitted). In the course of this project Menkel-Meadow
reports that "women shared information about their personal lives and brought sustenance to
each other." Id. at 56-57. Menkel-Meadow observes that "[v]irtually every report of women
lawyers discusses the impact of personal lives on professional lives and vice versa, where one
finds almost no such reports on the descriptions and ethnographies of male lawyers." Id. at
57. She concludes that the concern for the relation between one's work and personal life is
consistent with Gilligan's ethic of care and relationship. See id.
194 See K. O'Connor, supra note 176, at 100. A recent example is the amicus brief submit-
ted by the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and sixteen other groups in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
The idea for the brief came from "the thousands of letters written by women and men from all
over the country in response to NARAL's call for letters under the 'Silent No More' Cam-
paign." Paltrow, Amicus Brief. Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 3, 3 (1986). The brief "reflects the goals of the
reproductive rights movement by including the voices of women and men talking not just
about abortion but also the conditions of their lives." Id.; see also Cowan, supra note 176, at
397 (discussing amicus curiae brief filed by Center for Constitutional Rights in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)).
195 Some CLS rights critics frequently view creative envisioning in politics as in opposition
to the use of rights discourse. See text accompanying notes 17-47 supra. Some feminist com-
mentators have done so as well. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 2, at 429.
196 Zillah Eisenstein emphasizes the need "to move toward a theory of sexual equality that
does not reject the radical potential of feminism to move toward egalitarianism" and under-
scores how pervasive and threatening the idea of equality is. Z. Eisenstein, supra note 60, at
14.
197 See K. Lahey, Equality and Specificity in Feminist Thought (July 1985) (unpublished
paper on file at New York University Law Review).
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the law of equality to reflect a women's perspective. 198 Women's rights
discourse linked the specific experience of women with the universal
claim of rights. 199 This is, in and of itself, a radical and transforming
notion.
In addition, the advocacy process itself has had a significant effect in
mobilizing women for political action.2°° For women who have histori-
cally been excluded from public life and political action, activity in the
public sphere helps to transcend the public and private dichotomy. It
also helps women learn skills that are necessary to organize and mobilize
political support. In this sense, the struggle for rights has enabled wo-
men to become politically active and to gain power.201
At the same time, the women's movement's experience with fights
suffers from some of the problems discussed by rights critics. First, in
some sense the idea of equal rights, although radical in conception, has
not captured the scope and depth of the feminist program. Women's
rights have been, in a sense, "too little" for the women's movement,
although perhaps "too much" for society.202 Feminists understand that
genuine equality for women will not be achieved simply by winning
rights in court. Rather, equality requires social reconstruction of gender
roles within the workplace and the family. Rights claims, however, do
not effectively challenge existing social structures. Reflecting on the re-
productive rights experience, Rosalind Petchesky wrote:
[T]he concept of "rights," [is,] in general, a concept that is inherently
static and abstracted from social conditions. Rights are by definition
claims staked within a given order of things. They are demands for
access for oneself, or for "no admittance" to others; but they do not
challenge the social structure, the social relations of production and
198 Cole, supra note 57, at 83-84.
199 Kathleen Lahey's insightful paper, supra note 197, enriched my understanding of sexual
specificity and particularity and the way in which equality and specificity are interrelated. It is
important to recognize that rights claims are both particular and universal at the same time-
they link the particular and specific experience of a group or individual to a more universal
claim. Frank Michelman has suggested that a feminist theory of rights is important because it
attacks the pretension to universality which rights claims make and raises questions about the
degree to which some kind of generalized conversation about rights is possible. F. Michelman,
Comments on Cornell and Thurschwell, Feminism, Negativity and Intersubjectivity (1984)
(paper on file at New York University Law Review).
200 Rhonda Copelon discussed this point with me. Kathy Ferguson underscores the idea as
well. See K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 193-94.
201 For this reason, I find the sharpness of the dichotomy between rights and politics that
Gabel and Harris draw unsatisfactory. Gabel and Harris appropriately criticize the use of
rights in some circumstances as insufficiently focused on ways of gaining power, Gabel &
Harris, supra note 19, at 375-77, but they underestimate the ways in which rights claims can be
linked to claims for power.
202 Zillah Eisenstein argues that this was a fatal problem with the equal rights amendment.
See Z. Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 162-67.
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reproduction. The claim for "abortion rights" seeks access to a neces-
sary service, but by itself it fails to address the social relations and
sexual divisions around which responsibility for pregnancy and chil-
dren is assigned. In real-life struggles, this limitation exacts a price, for
it lets men and society neatly off the hook.
20 3
Second, the articulation of a right can, despite a movement's best
efforts, put the focus of immediate political struggle on winning the right
in court. Thus, even if one is concerned with and understands the need
for social reconstruction, it is hard to sustain an understanding of short
term goals at the same time. The concreteness and immediacy of legal
struggle tends to subsume the more diffuse role of political organizing
and education. Thus, while there has been a positive attitude toward the
use of legal rights in court as an aspect of law reform work, the problems
with rights have caused the women's movement to view the use of rights
with some ambivalence.
Third, since women's rights formulations oblige the state to act, seri-
ous questions about the appropriate role of the state in the context of
women's rights have emerged.2°4 Women's rights litigators argue that by
fighting for women's rights in the courts they do not exclusively rely on
the state. However, feminist skepticism over the ability of the state to
help women understandably heightens concern over feminist law reform
efforts both in the courts and the legislatures.20 5
Finally, despite some substantive gains in the legal treatment of wo-
203 R. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice 7 (1984) (footnote omitted). Similarly,
Isabel Marcus has questioned, in conversation with me, whether the language of rights is in-
herently too constraining. Does rights formulation make it hard for us to think beyond the
language of rights and get to the task of social reconstruction? For one answer, see Olsen,
supra note 2, at 429 n.199 ("rights... are devices used by feminists to deny what we really
want while getting what we want indirectly"). Sylvia Law has articulated a similar feminist
reaction to rights. She believes that rights can permit access to male experience but cannot do
the job of social reconstruction. For example, rights, particularly those won through litigation
efforts, might actually perpetuate the interrelated problems that exacerbate women's subordi-
nation, such as primary responsibility for childrearing. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Con-
stitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 995-97 (1984); see also Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, I
Law & Inequality: J. Theory & Prac. 1, 72 (1983) ("[O]btaining formal rights within existing
institutional structures is not sufficient. The objective must be to recast those structures to
accommodate more humane, less hierarchical forms of social experience.").
204 See MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 643; Olsen, supra note 2, at 393; Olsen, supra note 61,
at 1506. Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains the feminist dilemma concerning reliance on the
state in the following way:
It is simplistic to the point of being incorrect to say that we want to avoid using the
state at all costs to fight our battles. The use of the state in fighting feminist battles has
been a mixed bag. In that bag have come some very good things. Feminists have fought
very hard for laws that protect battered women and a number of other things .... It
would be incorrect for us all to abandon the state, as it would be for us to totally em-
brace the state. There are times that it helps us and times that it hurts us.
Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 86.
205 O'Connor and Epstein have suggested that women's rights efflorts have been more suc-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[V/ol. 61:589
DIALECTIC OF RIGHTS AND POLITICS
men,20 6 rights claims generally have had only limited success in the
cessful in the courts than in the legislatures. O'Connor & Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobby-
ing, supra note 176, at 142-43.
206 The women's rights legal movement has improved legal treatment of women in all as-
pects of women's lives-in education, in employment, within the family, and in terms of repro-
ductive control and personal autonomy. For a more detailed description of women's rights
under present laws, see S. Ross & A. Barcher, The Rights of Women (1983); Women and the
Law (C. Lefcourt ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987).
Sex discrimination in both public and private education has been challenged based on a
variety of constitutional theories. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) (holding that admission policies prohibiting men from enrolling in state-sponsored
nursing school violated fourteenth amendment). Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1982) prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance. This law broke down many barriers based on sex in higher
education, especially in athletic programs and master's degree programs. However, in Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571 (1984), the Supreme Court held that Title IX is "pro-
gram specific," in that it bans sex discrimination in particular educational programs receiving
federal funds, but not within the institution as a whole. Although this narrow reading of Title
IX has substantially weakened its impact, legislation pending in Congress would prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex at any educational institution receiving federal funding. See
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985, S. 431, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), H.R. 700, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
In the area of employment, sex discrimination litigation has been based on a range of
federal and state laws as well as the Constitution. See 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment
Discrimination: Sex §§ 3.00, 5.00-9.70 (1985). Much of the litigation has focused on Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Under Title VII, em-
ployers may not lawfully discharge, limit, or classify their employees in any way which de-
prives the employees of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects their status as
employees, because of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). The articulation of sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII has been a major development in the area. See note 251
infra. Similarly, the emerging doctrine of comparable worth-equal pay for work of compara-
ble value-is being developed through Title VII litigation. See, e.g., County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
Employment treatment of pregnant workers has raised many difficult problems. 'Wil-
liams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984-1985). In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494
(1974), the Supreme Court held that California's disability benefits program's exclusion of
benefits for normal pregnancy did not violate equal protection. Likewise, in General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976), the Court, relying heavily on Geduldig, determined that
for Title VII purposes, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination. In
response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982)). The PDA requires that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions... be treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
Recently, the Supreme Court held that the PDA did not preempt a California statute provid-
ing preferential treatment to pregnant employees. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 683 (1987). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether similar legislation
from other states will also be upheld.
In the area of family law, the legal rights of women are in a state of flux; this is true in
"traditional" heterosexual family units as well as family units created by single women and
lesbians. See Women and the Law, supra, §§ 4.01-6.10; Sexual Orientation and the Law
§§ 1.01-1.05 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985). Recently, many states have modified laws and created
new laws concerned with issues of divorce, but these legal reforms have not always accom-
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courts. 207 Although rights critics argue that even looking to results
makes it easier to rely on what courts do as the primary measure of the
movement's success, it remains necessary to consider results. For exam-
ple, even though women's rights to reproductive choice have im-
proved,208 access to those rights for poor women and especially poor
women of color has not been adequately protected. 20 9 More generally,
plished their goal. See Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce,
1983 Wis. L. Rev. 789, 886 (arguing that divorce reform legislation's "focus on equality im-
peded the development of doctrine that would have more effectively represented a female per-
spective"). Many of these laws have had unfortunate, unexpected economic consequences for
women. See generally L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985) (arguing that "gender-
neutral" divorce laws ignore economic inequality that marriage and society have created for
women); note 210 infra. In the area of reproductive rights, there is some legal protection of
women's rights to reproductive control. See note 209 infra.
207 See generally M. Berger, supra note 176; S. Ross & A. Barcher, supra note 206; Freed-
man, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913 (1983).
208 In 1973, the Supreme Court decided that the fundamental right of privacy-which de-
rived from the concept of personal liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment--encom-
passed a woman's rights, in consultation with her physician, to decide whether to bear a child.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
209 Since 1973 when Roe v. Wade was decided, many individuals and groups have sought to
limit women's access to abortion via a variety of strategies. For example, proposed constitu-
tional amendments have been introduced in Congress which seek to eliminate entirely the
choice of abortion. See, e.g., Human Life Federalism Amendment, S.J. Res. 3, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). To date, these proposals have not met with success. See Pearson & Kurtz, The
Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 427, 446-47
(1985). The Reagan Administration's Justice Department submitted amicus curiae briefs in
two cases requesting that the Supreme Court abandon the Roe analysis. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986); Diamond v.
Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986). In Thornburgh, the Roe analysis was reaffirmed, but only by a
single vote.
Further, access to abortion for many women has been limited through the elimination of
Medicaid funding for most abortions. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)(holding that
state need not pay for abortions for which federal reimbursement unavailable). Approximately
one-quarter of American jurisdictions limit the use of state, local, and federal pass-through
funding for abortions. See George, State Legislatures Versus the Supreme Court: Abortion
Legislation in the 1980's, 12 Pepperdine L. Rev. 427, 508-09 (1985).
Finally, many states have enacted statutory provisions attempting to limit a woman's
access to abortion. The Supreme Court has been called upon many times to interpret the
constitutionality of these limitations. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down various portions of Akron, Ohio abortion
ordinance relative to parental consent, informed consent, 24 hour waiting period, performance
of all second trimester abortions in hospital, and disposal of fetal remains); H.L v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding Utah statute that required physician to notify parents of de-
pendent, unmarried minor seeking abortion); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking
down Massachusetts statute that required parental consent before abortion could be obtained
by unmarried woman under age of eighteen, on ground that it permitted court to withhold
judicial authorization for abortion from minor found to be mature and competent to make
independent decision, and failed to provide alternative means by which authorization could be
obtained); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down various provi-
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even with concrete legal gains, it is not clear how the lives of most wo-
men, particularly poor women and women of color, have changed. Cer-
tainly women's economic realities have not improved. 210
sions of Missouri statute which required husband's, or in the case of unmarried minor, par-
ent's, prior written consent for abortion unless abortion was necessary to save woman's life);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating section of Georgia Criminal Code requiring
hospitalization for all abortions because first trimester abortions were not excluded as required
by Roe v. Wade).
210 Women are disproportionately represented among the poor in the United States. See
generally, H. Scott, Working Your Way to the Bottom: The Feminization of Poverty (1984).
The number of poor people living in female-headed households rose dramatically between
1970 and 1983 from 7.5 million to 12 million. National Soc. Sci. & L. Center, Women and
Poverty 3 (July 23, 1985) (memorandum on file at New York University Law Review).
Though the number of poor people living in households headed by women declined in 1984
(paralleling a decrease in the poverty rate for the nation as a whole), it remains alarmingly
high. While only 16% of the nation's households are headed by women, according to 1984
Census Bureau figures, these households comprise 48% of all families living below the poverty
line. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 3. The poverty rate for the country as a whole
is 14.4%, yet 34.5% of all female-headed households are poor. The picture for minority wo-
men is even bleaker-53.4% of female headed hispanic families and 51.7% of female headed
black families live below the poverty line. Id. Poverty is very prevalent among elderly women
as well. In 1982, women accounted for 59.1% of the non-institutionalized aged population,
but were 70.9% of the aged poor. Institute for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wisconsin-
Madison, Poverty in the United States-Where Do We Stand Now, 7 Focus 7 (1984).
Further, many women in the United States are "invisibly poor." H. Scott, supra, at 17.
Although half the women of working age were in the labor force in 1980, only about half of
these workers earned more than the minimum necessary to keep a family of two above the
poverty line. Thus, some 75% of all American women aged 16 to 64 would be dependent on
resources other than their own earned income if they had to support themselves and one other
person. Id.
Women who are employed in the workplace receive much lower salaries and work related
benefits than do men. They continue to be concentrated in traditional female-dominated low
paying job categories which offer little possibility for advancement. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women at Work: A Chartbook 10-11 (1983). The disparity in wages of
male and female full-time workers has increased over time. Whereas in 1955 women earned
63.9 cents for every dollar earned by men, by 1981 women were earning only 59.2 cents for
every dollar earned by men. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Time of Change: 1983
Handbook on Women Workers 82 (1983)[hereinafter Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on
Women Workers].
Women's income increases at a much more modest rate than men's with increasing levels
of education and is lower than men's for any given level of education. For example, in 1983,
women workers with four or more years of college had an average income only slightly above
that of men who had only one to three years of high school-14,679 and $12,117, respec-
tively. See 131 Cong. Rec. H4012 (daily ed. June 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Long).
Because women often take time out from the workforce to raise families, they qualify for
lower and fewer benefits than men and have less opportunity for career advancement. This
problem is particularly felt by mature women entering or reentering the labor force. Faced
with severely limited employment opportunites, women experience joblessness more often than
men. Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on Women Workers, supra, at 88-89.
There are 5.4 million "displaced homemakers" in the United States. H. Scott, supra, at
23. These women have never held jobs outside the home; rather, they worked in the home
producing children and maintaining the household. These workers have never earned employ-
ment wages, thus they are not entitled to unemployment benefits if forced to leave their jobs
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Yet in some areas of women's rights, there have been important vic-
tories for individual women, for women as a class, and for the develop-
ment of substantive legal doctrine. Public consciousness of sex
discrimination in the law, for example, has increased. 211 Looking at the
gains and losses together, I believe that the struggles around legal rights
have moved the women's movement forward and reinforced a sense of
collective experience for the movement. In sum, I share Mary Dunlap's
view that
I think we have to look, if only to maintain momentum, at the parts of
what we have done with feminism in law that have moved us for-
ward.... Just the fact that we have prioritized and gotten as far as we
have, just the fact that there is so much vital activity in each of these
[areas], just the fact that women are in court and are being heard-
sometimes, at least-in a different voice makes a difference. 212
B. Rights to Equality and Reproductive Choice
The women's rights movement articulated women's right to equal
treatment as a claim of equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and women's right to procreative freedom as a claim of liberty and
privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
way in which equality and reproductive rights issues were formulated by
women and distorted and limited by the courts raises serious questions
about how rights claims affect social movements.
The issue of equal treatment 213 poses the theoretical problem of
because of the divorce from or death of their spouse. While men often experience economic
benefit from divorce, contrary to popular belief, women seldom do. Id.
When women reach old age, a lifetime of work at low paying jobs or as homemakers leave
them with few resources on which to fall back. Only 14% of all women retirees, both home-
makers and workers, receive any pension benefits other than Social Security. See 131 Cong.
Rec. H4010 (daily ed. June 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Schroeder). Most women receive lower
social security benefits than do men. Id.
211 The presence of many articles in "popular" magazines regarding sex discrimination and
related issues indicates increased public consciousness of the problem. See, e.g., Connelly,
Women on the Job: Are Things Really Changing?, Seventeen, Aug. 1985, at 152; Is Teaching a
Hands-on-Profession? Two Educators Warn of Sexual Harassment in America's Colleges,
People Weekly, Oct. 15, 1984, at 99; Rhoads, Money: Getting Credit When Credit is Due-
The New Legal Options for Women, Vogue, Apr. 1985, at 177; Sullivan, A Law That Needs
New Muscle, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 4, 1985, at 9.
212 Feminist Discourse, supra note 57, at 17-18.
213 A rich body of legal scholarship on equality theory has been developed by feminist
scholars over the last ten years. I have drawn on many of these articles for my analysis in this
section, even though this section only touches on some of the themes more fully developed in
this literature. See, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment Of Working Women (1979);
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971); Dunlap, Toward Recognition of "A
Right to Be Sexual," 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 245 (1982); Freedman, supra note 207; Gins-
burg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 Wash. U.
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sameness and difference. Equal protection of the law is guaranteed only
to those who are similarly situated.214 Thus, the issue for equality theory
is comparative-who is the same as whom. 215 In deciding this issue of
comparability, difficult questions must be considered concerning whose
standards are the norm, whether women and men really are different,
what differences are real (biologically based or socially constructed), 21 6
and whether these differences, if they do exist, really matter.
The comparative equal rights approach has had limited political and
doctrinal success in the courts and legislatures. The equal rights vision
was substantially limited by the defeat of the federal equal rights amend-
ment.217 Because both the public and the courts viewed the equal rights
amendment as a litmus test of political support for the women's move-
ment, its defeat affected the movement nationally,218 even though on the
state level, state equal rights amendments have had greater success. 219
Further, despite efforts by feminist litigators to formulate women's rights
claims as if no differences existed between men and women, the Supreme
Court has read in differences. 220 Finally, the Supreme Court has viewed
equality claims as distinct from reproductive choice claims.221 Despite
L.Q. 161; Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. IIl. L.F. 39; Law, supra note 203; Scales, Towards
a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1981); Segal, Sexual Equality, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the ERA, 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 85 (1984); Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Dis-
crimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 Or. L. Rev. 265 (1984);
Williams, The Crisis in Equality Theory: Maternity, Sexuality and Women, 7 Women's Rts. L.
Rep. 175 (1982); Williams, supra note 206; Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1981); Taub, Book Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1686 (1980).
214 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344
(1949). The authors go on to raise a second issue of equal protection analysis which questions
precisely when individuals or groups are similarly situated. Id. at 344-53.
215 See generally Freedman, supra note 207, at 931-49 (discussing "definitional" differences
and "legally created" differences between men and women); Williams, supra note 213, at 176-
90 (reviewing "gender equality" decisions of Supreme Court); Note, supra note 213 (discussing
redefinitions of meaning of sexual equality).
216 See sources cited in note 213 supra.
217 See generally Rhode, supra note 203, at 9-47 (chronology of defeat of equal rights
amendment).
218 Id. at 38-47, 62-67.
219 See B. Brown, A. Freedman, H. Katz & A. Price, Women's Rights and the Law: The
Impact of the ERA on State Laws 37-38 (1977); Avner, Some Observations on State Equal
Rights Amendments, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 144, 145-46 (1985); Note, State Equal Rights
Amendments: Legislative Reform and Judicial Activism, 4 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 227, 232-34
(1978).
220 Freedman, supra note 207, at 938-40; Taub & Schneider, supra note 187, at 134-35.
221 Law, supra note 203, at 988. Sylvia Law explains that there are several reasons for this
separation of equality claims from reproductive choice claims.
[D]uring the early 1970's the constitutional rights of women began to be recognized
by the Supreme Court, but several forces encouraged the Court to avoid addressing the
relationship between sex-based equality and biological differences. First, those primarily
responsible for developing a constitutional doctrine of sex-based equality, including the
ACLU and the proponents of the ERA, adopted what amounted to an assimilationist
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the vigorous efforts of feminist litigators to argue that pregnancy discrim-
ination violates equality principles, 222 the Supreme Court has held that
since the capacity to become pregnant is "unique" to women, rules con-
cerning pregnancy do not violate equal protection. 223 Thus, despite
widespread acknowledgement by the women's movement of the central-
ity of pregnancy and reproductive choice to women's subordination,
pregnancy and reproductive choice have not been seen by the Court as
problems of equality.
The movement for reproductive choice played a critical role in the
early development of the women's movement. 224 In the early 1970s large
vision of sex equality, which minimized the significance of biological differences. Sec-
ond, many who worked to develop constitutional doctrine to support reproductive free-
dom emphasized rights of privacy, physician discretion, and the vagueness and
uncertainty of the criminal laws prohibiting abortions. The decision to deemphasize sex
discrimination in the reproductive freedom cases reflected a judgment that privacy was a
more conservative and, hence, stronger constitutional tool than sex-based equality.
Id. at 981-82 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, equality arguments were presented by feminist
litigators in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see Brief for Amici Curiae New Women Law-
yers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition 25-33,
Roe v. Wade (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (on file at New York University Law Review), and later in
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982), see Brief for Amici Curiae N.J.
Coalition for Battered Women, N.J. Coalition for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization
Abuse (CARASA), Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), Women's Resource and Sur-
vival Center, Right to Choose v. Byrne, reprinted in 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 286-90, 296-99
(1982). Indeed, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986), suggests that an equal protection dimension
might exist in privacy issues. Id. at 2184-85.
222 See generally Williams, supra note 206, at 329-32 (describing general doctrinal frame-
work of "equal treatment" approach developed in sex discrimination cases by feminist
litigators).
223 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-97 (1974). Sylvia Law has observed that
[d]octrinally, however, Geduldig has made it more difficult to claim that reproductive
freedom is an aspect of sex-based equality. If discrimination against pregnant women is
not sex-based when the woman seeks to carry her pregnancy to term, it is hard to argue
that it is sex-based for the state to create obstacles to abortion. Since 1973, literally
hundreds of legal challenges to restrictive abortion laws have been brought, and only a
very few of the cases have argued that the restrictions violated sex equality norms.
However, doctrine is not the only reason why sex equality claims have not been
asserted in defense of women's abortion rights. Over the years following Roe v. Wade,
women's struggle for control of their bodies has been transformed into debates about
medical practice and moral and religious views of the personhood of the fetus. In the
abortion debate, women's lives and sex-based equality have become distinctly secondary
issues. The decision in Roe v. Wade established the Court as a single, highly visible
target for opponents of abortion. By raising issues of institutional competence, the deci-
sion also provided a basis of opposition to abortion distinct from the merits of reproduc-
tive freedom itself.
Law, supra note 203, at 985-86 (footnotes omitted).
224 See generally Law, supra note 203, at 969-73 (describing early development of women's
movement); Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, Doe and Roe: Where Do We Go from Here?, I
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 20, 23-24 (1973) (panel discussion on landmark decisions of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
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groups of women organized to demonstrate against state laws that
criminalized abortion and to challenge abortion laws in the courts. 225
Although feminists articulated this "women's right" as a right to liberty,
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade2 2 6 decided the issue on privacy
grounds.227 Thus, in Roe, a woman's right to choose whether to have an
abortion was seen as a woman's private decision, which left her free from
state and medical interference in the first trimester, but allowed the
state's interest in the decision to increase in the second trimester and
eventually outweigh her interest in the third trimester.
The development of women's rights to equality and reproductive
choice have had an important ideological effect on the women's rights
movement, but the doctrinal evolution of these rights, as the reproduc-
tive rights example suggests, has muddied their ideological meaning.
First, feminist commentators widely believe that the Court's distinct the-
oretical articulation of reproductive control as a right to privacy separate
from equality constrains political analysis on both a practical and ideo-
logical level and reinforces ideological separation of deeply interrelated
oppression. 228
225 Sylvia Law describes the early abortion struggle in this way.
By the late 1960's many women had participated in the civil rights and antiwar
movements and had learned new political skills. Also of invaluable importance to the
struggle for women's rights were the consciousness-raising groups of the late 1960's.
Through these groups women discovered that their most intimate personal concerns
were shared by other women and that their private, individual lives were shaped by deep
social and cultural structures. These groups provided women with the solidarity and
strength to seek transformation of themselves and society. The contemporary revision
of constitutional doctrine in relation to sex equality and reproduction is the product of
these radical shifts in women's consciousness and behavior. When women began chal-
lenging legal restraints on human liberty, their central focus was on laws denying wo-
men access to abortion.
In a number of cities across the country there were women coming forward
and saying, I had an abortion, I had an illegal abortion and this is how I had it, and
telling the details. What was really happening to women day in and day out was no
longer a matter of private horror and embarrassment but became a public issue.
These women, in cooperation with medical, family planning, and religious groups, per-
suaded many state legislatures to liberalize criminal statutes prohibiting abortions.
In 1969 women began integrating constitutional litigation into this organizational
and educational effort. Suits often named hundreds and sometimes thousands of women
as individual plaintiffs. Live testimony educated judges, lawyers, and the public about
the impact of unwanted pregnancy upon women's lives. Women filled courtrooms,
bringing babies and the coat hangers that symbolize illegal abortions. Despite women's
paramount concern for the right to obtain abortions, the constitutionality of government
restrictions on the right was not presented to the courts as a clear issue of sex equality.
Law, supra note 203, at 971-73 (quoting Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 224, at
23.
226 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
227 Id. at 152-56.
228 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 45, at 232-37; Law, supra note 203, at 987-1002; Editor's
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Second, feminist commentators find the very articulation of the wo-
men's right to procreative freedom as a matter of privacy to be problem-
atic, 229 because it reinforces and legitimizes the public and private
dichotomy which historically has been damaging to women. For women,
the domestic sphere and sexuality-primary areas of subordination-
have been viewed as private and unregulated. 2 0 Although the right has
a powerful collective dimension which could be used to emphasize group
values as well as to develop the strands of individual autonomy, 23' as
interpreted by the Court, it is primarily individualistic in that it simply
protects an individual's right to choose.232 Most significantly, analyzing
the right to reproductive choice as a right of privacy emphasizes the pro-
cess of decision making, which entails a balancing of interests throughout
the term of the pregnancy, rather than the importance of abortion itself,
which concerns the control that a woman should have over her own body
and life decisions.
On the other hand, the impact on social movements of a court's
particular decision or doctrinal formulation cannot be easily mea-
sured.233 For example, how do we know what effect the doctrinal limita-
tions which the Supreme Court has placed on the right to reproductive
choice has had on the consciousness and politics of the women's move-
ment? How do we know that the Court's rejection of the right to liberty
and the narrower characterization of the reproductive right as a right of
privacy have not affected the women's movement's understanding, for
instance, of issues of doctor-patient relationships or state-funded abor-
tion? Winning the right to procreative choice in the Supreme Court cer-
tainly helped many women regardless of the particular doctrinal
formulation developed. Winning it as a right of privacy may have given
some activists a false sense of security, but it has led others to greater
insights into the mutable nature of the legal right to choose.
Ultimately, women's rights formulations by both feminists and the
courts are best considered from a dialectical perspective. On an ideologi-
cal level, the formulation of women's rights in both the equality and re-
productive rights contexts has simultaneously expanded and limited our
Note, Privacy or Sex Discrimination Doctrine: Must There Be a Choice?, 4 Harv. Women's
L.J. ix, ix-xiv (1981). Rhonda Copelon has helped me to understand this.
229 See Colker, supra note 45, at 198-201; Law, supra note 203, at 1016-17.
230 See Olsen, supra note 61, at 1521-22; Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Di-
rections of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 55, 78; Taub & Schneider, supra note
187, at 118-25.
231 Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361, 366-67 (1979).
232 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
233 David Trubek raised this important issue with me.
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perspective on women's subordination. In both contexts, the articulation
of the right was necessary to allow new contradictions to unfold.
The equal rights focus of the early women's movement is a good
example. The emphasis on equal rights, which reflected an egalitarian
strain in the women's movement and has historically dominated the wo-
men's movement, was adopted for several reasons. The contemporary
women's movement grew out of the civil rights struggle.234 Thus, there
was a strategic orientation to analogize to the civil rights experience, this
time struggling to include sex within the ambit of the fourteenth amend-
ment and to ensure passage of the equal rights amendment. The
women's movement also recognized the risks of asserting a distinct wo-
men's perspective and asserting differences because difference had histor-
ically led to paternalism and exclusion. 23 5
This emphasis on equality rights, however, although understanda-
ble, arguably narrowed the movement's focus and constricted its vision
of possible change. It certainly tended to cause women to analyze their
experience from a comparative perspective and to stress political debate
over equal treatment with men, rather than over empowerment, self-ac-
tualization, or "women-centered" perspectives generally. 236 This limita-
tion on the scope of equality rights was also encouraged by the fact that
many of the plaintiffs raising and benefitting from equal rights claims
were men.237 The factual context of much litigation that featured an in-
dividual plaintiff's attempt to "get" something from society, such as mili-
tary dependents' benefits, 238 increased social security,239 property tax
exemptions, 24° or admission to a sex-segregated nursing school,241 ap-
peared to narrow the focus of equality rights even further.
Moreover, because the women's movement articulated its equality
concerns using a rights language that frequently becomes symbolic and
reified, 242 the movement's ability to account for the range of potential
political strategies and to determine appropriate reforms in any given
area became more difficult. The equal rights perspective also made it
234 M. Berger, supra note 176, at 6-7; S. Evans, supra note 62, at 24-101.
235 This problem has been mirrored in feminist theory generally. See Z. Eisenstein, supra
note 60, at 12-14 (arguing for new feminist politics that will allow women to move beyond
issue of sameness and difference).
236 For analysis of the development of a woman-centered perspective in feminist theory, see
A. Jaggar, supra note 58, at 369-77.
237 See Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2
Law & Inequality: J. Theory & Prac. 33 (1984) (analyzing how equality doctrine has been
shaped by claims of male plaintiffs).
23" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
239 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
240 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
241 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
242 See Fineman, supra note 206, at 884-85; Rhode, supra note 203, at 7-8.
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easier for women to avoid the complex question of biological and social
differences. Finally, some argue that the pervasiveness of an equality
perspective contributed to an emphasis within the women's movement on
the "symbolic" equality of rules that reflected formal, as opposed to sub-
stantive, fairness and justice.243
Nevertheless, the struggle over equal rights was a necessary develop-
ment for the women's movement. Through the beginning efforts to artic-
ulate equal rights, the women's movement acquired a broader and clearer
understanding of what it wanted, what obstacles it faced, how deep the
phenomenon of sexism went, and how hard it was to affect meaningful
change.244 The movement also learned about the limitations and inade-
quacies of rights to perform the prerequisite economic and social recon-
struction for meaningful change for women. The development of an
equality perspective enabled women to understand the tenacity of "neu-
tral" standards based on male experience 245 and legitimized discussion of
equality within public discourse. 246
Further, both the legal movements for equal rights and reproductive
rights emerged organically out of the women's movement. At the grass
roots level, the movement helped to shape legal strategies, particularly
for reproductive rights.247 The articulation of these rights expressed a
collective project that began with a description of women's experience,
translated that experience into legal formulation, and through that for-
mulation asserted a demand for power.
In a certain sense, these claims, articulated in the language of rights,
have advanced the political development and organizing potential of the
movement, and expanded and concretized the consciousness of feminist
activists and litigators. By thus providing a public vehicle for expressing
what women want,2 4 8 the rights struggle clarified and heightened the de-
243 See Fineman, supra note 206, at 885; Note, supra note 213, at 505-06.
244 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 207, at 913-17; Williams, supra note 213, at 190-200.
245 See Segal, supra note 213, at 146-47; Note, supra note 213, at 487-88; Taub, supra note
213, at 1690-91.
246 See sources cited in note 211 supra.
247 However, my colleague Margaret Berger has noted that women's rights litigators were
sometimes cut off from grass roots efforts. M. Berger, supra note 176, at 60-61.
248 But see Olsen, supra note 2, at 429 n. 199.
One of the basic premises underlying most feminist legal writing is that we can
move toward a more just and equal society by establishing rights for women and enforc-
ing these ights.... But feminist legal criticism is most successful as it moves away from
these notions and into the risky territory of real concerns that are political rather than
neutral or impartial. Abstract rights and neutral rules are devices used by feminists to
deny what we really want while getting what we want indirectly.
Id. Fran Olsen suggests that feminists should "stop trying to fit our goals into abstract rights
arguments and instead call for what we really want." Id. at 430.
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bates within the movement itself249 and then turned these insights back
into theory. For instance, even though the efforts of feminist litigators to
treat pregnancy as an equality issue failed in the courts,250 the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was passed as a result of efforts based on feminist
legal argumentation to fit pregnancy into a discrimination model-Title
VII.25I Now, however, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's equal treat-
ment model has been challenged on the ground that it bars employers
from taking account of women's special needs for maternity leave.25 2
249 Olsen has also suggested that, in the context of the women's movement, rights formula-
tions have an arguably negative impact on the development of social movements because they
magnify disagreement. See id. at 430. Martha Fineman has raised a related question with me:
Is there a difference between a dialogue among ourselves on issues of disagreement and going
to court (particularly since courts and judges have not been receptive to women's rights
claims)? My response reflects the recent women's movement experience with the issue of por-
nography.
The strategy of raising the issue of pornography as a violation of a woman's civil rights
(through legislation, not merely claims of rights in court) has generated much controversy and
disagreement within the women's movement. See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 321 (1984) (pornography is a politics of male dominance, distinct from obscenity
law, based on male morality, and therefore free speech arguments applied to obscenity should
not bar efforts to stop pornography); Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A
Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 130 (1984) (governmental suppression
of pornography is not proper method to increase power of women because it involves "danger-
ous evisceration of the first amendment"); Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography and Law, 133 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 497 (1985) (although antipornography laws have some value, feminists should be
wary of male-dominated state and should accordingly avoid endorsing state regulation of por-
nography). This disagreement has certainly been experienced by many women as unfortunate
and painful, particularly when women's groups have argued opposing positions before courts.
See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985).
Further, some feminists who proposed antipornography ordinances did not submit their strat-
egy to wide critique before their implementation, nor were they receptive to critique after
implementation, thereby creating friction within the movement. I found this friction particu-
larly evident during a debate between Catharine MacKinnon and Nan Hunter at the Sixteenth
National Conference on Women and the Law (New York, New York 1985). Any controver-
sial strategy that goes "public" can magnify disagreements which many would rather debate
internally within the women's movement. This problem may be exacerbated, of course, when
we are arguing contrary positions in court. Most recently, the issues raised in California Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 683 (1987), exemplified this problem.
250 See Law, supra note 203, at 979-87; see also Williams, supra note 206, at 333-80 (analy-
sis of developing feminist perspective on pregnancy as an equality issue).
251 Williams, supra note 206, at 347-48.
252 See note 206 supra. Compare Williams, supra note 206, at 380 (arguing that "the 'equal
treatment' approach to pregnant wage workers, both as a litigative and legislative matter, is
demonstrably" better than the "special treatment" approach) with Krieger & Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's
Equality, 13 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 513, 542 (1983) (arguing that equal treatment model
"fails to focus on the effect of the very real sex difference of pregnancy and the relative posi-
tions of men and women in society") and Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out
of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1182 (1986) (arguing that
equality analysis is of little use to women in context of pregnancy and should be supplemented
'with a concept of responsibility, to others arising out of [human] interconnectedness").
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Thus, at each stage of the process, contradictions have emerged which
have clarified differences and moved the debate to new levels.
Both the right to equality and the right to reproductive choice are
rights derived from the contexts of political struggle and feminist organi-
zation. Both rights emerged from a radical feminist vision that equality
was not limited to formal legal treatment or assimilation of women into
male roles, but rather required the radical restructuring of society. The
expression of these visions began with the formulation of rights claims in
the courts. Yet even though these visions have neither been nor could be
achieved in the courts, their introduction through rights claims started
the "conversation" in society at large about women's roles and women's
subordination under the law.
The radical impulse behind the notion of women's equality and re-
productive control, then, is powerful. By concretizing an abstract idea
and situating it within women's experience, these rights claims did not
simply "occupy" an existing right, but rather modified and tranformed
the nature of the right. These claims, then derived from concrete strug-
gle and political vision, articulate a notion of collective experience. They
do not simply reflect an individual woman's claim, but rather have a
communal dimension that can expand opportunities for women as a
class.
C. Sexual Harassment and Battering
Both the concept of sexual harassment and the notion of legal pro-
tection for battered women emerged directly from feminist thinking on
issues of sexuality in the 1970s. Both areas suggest the importance of
legal thinking tied to political struggle and to the experience of women
themselves.
The history of sexual harassment is an important example of the
creative development of rights.25 3 The experience of what is now called
sexual harassment 254 did not even have a name until feminist thinkers
253 For the history of the development of sexual harassment as a legal claim, see generally
C. MacKinnon, supra note 213; MacKinnon, Introduction, Symposium: Sexual Harassment,
10 Cap. U.L. Rev. i (1981).
254 State and federal courts have recognized various common law and statutory causes of
action available to employees who have experienced some form of sexual harassment in the
workplace. The common law causes of action include wrongful discharge claims in both con-
tract, Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984), and tort, id.; Holien v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984), and claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983), and
for negligence, Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, aff'd, 251 Ga. 491, 307 S.E.2d
474 (1983). Statutory causes of action have been based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) and various state civil rights statutes. See, e.g.,
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (holding that claim of hostile environment
sexual harassment is form of sex-discrimination actionable under Title VII); Barnes v. Costle,
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provided it with one.255 Widely practiced, it was viewed as a normal and
inevitable activity of men when exposed to female co-workers. The idea
of sexual harassment as a harm, and as an experience that was not simply
normal, private, or individual to one woman, was developed through the
work of feminist theorists and litigators. 256 This work gave formerly pri-
vate and hidden experience a public dimension and so legitimized it as a
subject of public discourse.
Sexual harassment defined an injury to an individual woman and to
women as a class from a woman's perspective.25 7 It emerged out of femi-
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Title VII protects the job of woman who repelled
her male superior's sexual advances); see also Holien, 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (discussing
application of Title VII to claims of sexual harassment and remedies available under it and
state law). Under Title VII, courts have analyzed sexual harassment claims in terms of dispa-
rate treatment. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (where
employer treated particular individual less favorably than other employees based upon sex).
Courts have also analyzed these claims in terms of an offensive work environment. See, e.g.,
id. at 901-03 (sexual harassment constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to a
condition of work); Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2404-06 (an "offensive work environment" sexual
harassment claim was actionable under Title VII).
The articulation of sexual harassment in the workplace as a legally cognizable wrong is
important because it facilitates the ongoing process of creating a social norm which recognizes
that to impose a burden upon workers based on irrelevant sexual attributes is unacceptable in
any context. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1451 (1984). Yet, recognition by courts of a cause of action based
on sexual harassment is only the initial step in providing a remedy to the individual victims of
sexual harassment and to the class of individuals to which they belong.
Although claims of sexual harassment have been recognized under a range of legal theo-
ries, there are significant legal obstacles that prevent women from obtaining relief. Plaintiffs
who articulate their claims under Title VII must anticipate judicial reluctance to agree that the
conduct they complain of constitutes sexual harassment. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 85-9, 37
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1893 (May 7, 1985) (woman's clothing store that required fe-
male employees to wear revealing swimsuits as part of swimwear promotion did not violate
Title VII when it discharged three employees for refusing to comply). Further, courts con-
tinue to struggle with the concept that sexual harassment constitutes employment discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 900 n.2. The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor, holding
that sexual harassment in the workplace is a serious wrong, 106 S. Ct. 2399, should, however,
support efforts to define sexual harassment broadly.
255 See Karst, supra note 57, at 505 n.227. "As the first legal wrong to be defined by wo-
men, sexual harassment has been called a feminist invention. Women were subjected to sexual
attention they were not in a position to refuse long before the state recognized it is an injury
under some circumstances." MacKinnon, supra note 253, at i.
256 The Working Women's Institute was founded in 1975 to develop educational and train-
ing programs concerning sexual harassment. See Letter from Working Women's Institute
(May 1984) (on file at New York University Law Review). For an example of the Institute's
work, see, e.g., Sexual Harassment Brief Bank and Bibliography, 8 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 267
(1985). In addition to Catharine MacKinnon, other feminist litigators such as Nadine Taub,
Anne Simon, Joan Vermeulen, and Mary Dunlap have been involved in sexual harassment
litigation and the development of the legal theory of sexual harassment.
257 "[I]t took a feminist movement to expose these experiences [of sexual harassment] as
systematic and harmful in the first place, because feminism was the first politics to take wo-
men's point of view on our own situation as definitive of that situation." MacKinnon, supra
note 253, at ii.
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nist perceptions and theories about the role of sexuality and from an ef-
fort to name and define women's experience and oppression.258 It
developed as part of an effort to assist women in asserting control over
their sexuality.259 The concept of sexual harassment and the definition of
harm that developed reflected the methodology of consciousness-raising
applied to law.
At the same time, the articulation of claims of sexual harassment
has led to the unfolding of new problems, arising in part because of the
very gains realized in the recognition of sexual harassment as a cogniza-
ble wrong. These new dilemmas concern the scope of employer liability,
visions of women as sexual victims, not actors, and victim-precipita-
tion.260 These tensions highlight important concerns which can then
reshape theory and so push feminist analysis forward.
The assertion of rights for battered women developed as an out-
growth of the women's movement experience and the insights of feminist
theory.261 In the 1970s, projects to help battered women suddenly ap-
peared throughout the United States, and by the 1980s a real national
battered women's movement existed. 262 Legal claims emerging from this
movement, based on the right of battered women to protection from
abuse,263 revealed important dimensions of patriarchy. The movement
sought to change police practices, develop legislation to criminalize bat-
tering, enforce the victim's rights, and increase a victim's protection and
legal options.264 Some of these legislative reforms made particularly cre-
258 Id. at viii.
259 Id.
260 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406-09 (1986).
261 S. Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered
Women's Movement 29 (1982).
262 Id. at 1.
263 See id. at 157-83.
264 Beginning in the mid-1970s, American feminists began to organize nationally to end
domestic violence in the United States. See S. Schechter, supra note 261, at 136-38. As a
result of this work, almost every state has passed legislation creating new legal remedies for
battered women. See Lerman & Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 Re-
sponse 1 (1983) (on file at New York University Law Review). For example, state laws now
provide for the issuance of civil orders of protection, and in many states these may be awarded
on an ex parte basis in emergency situations. See id. at 6-8. In most states, such orders may
include a provision that the abuser vacate the home. Id. Further, many states now have provi-
sions for warrantless arrests for misdemeanors. Id. at 4; see, e.g., State ex. rel. Williams v.
Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (upholding warrantless arrest for misdemeanor).
Many battered women have successfully brought civil damage actions against their at-
tackers. See, e.g., Gay v. Gay, 62 N.C. App. 288, 302 S.E.2d 495 (1983). Additionally, some
battered women have brought successful suits against local police who did not arrest their
assailants. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). The
marital rape exemption has been successfully challenged as well. See, e.g., People v. Liberta,
64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); see also National Center on Women
& Family Law, Marital Rape Exemption Packet (Oct. 1986) (compiling case, statutory, and
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ative connections between battering and patriarchy as, for example, state
legislation which used money from marriage license fees to fund battered
women's shelters. 265 The claim that women had a right not to be bat-
tered, a right to require husbands to leave the house, and a right to get
orders of protection emerged from the efforts of feminist activists and
thinkers to define the problem of battering.
Both the articulation of the right to be free from sexual harassment
and claims for legal protection of battered women appear more affirma-
tive and less problematic than the previous rights struggle over equality.
Legal challenges involving equality have not explicitly argued for the so-
cial reconstruction necessary to help women achieve sufficient freedom
and equality. The legal formulation of the battered women and sexual
harassment rights claims, however, flows more directly from the political
statement that these claims of right make than does the formulation of
equal rights claims. Is it because the political message and demand of
these claims is narrower, simpler, or clearer? Is it because these claims
have done better, thus far, in the courts? Or is it because the develop-
ment of both legal rights is at an earlier stage than that of equality and
reproductive rights? Both sexual harassment and battered women's
rights emerged directly out of collectively developed political theory and
practice concerning patriarchy and sexuality. The theory exposed new
harms and expanded understanding by labeling these previously private
issues as public harms. The claims of right reflected a shared political
understanding that women needed to be free from sexual subordination
and violence and made important statements about women's autonomy.
Moreoever, the scope of both rights as articulated by feminist litigation
was broad. For example, sexual harassment claims did not simply rest
on the employment treatment of individual women, but rather on a
broader understanding of how a workplace environment can be tainted
other information on the marital rape exemption) (on file at New York University Law Re-
view).
Yet, despite these changes in the laws and successful court actions, women who are sub-
jected to violence in their homes still encounter difficulties at all levels of the legal and criminal
justice systems when seeking to put an end to these attacks. See, e.g., Pastoor, Police Training
and the Effectiveness of Minnesota "Domestic Abuse" Laws, 2 Law & Inequality: J. Theory &
Prac. 557 (1984) (arguing that "domestic abuse" laws cannot be effectively enforced without
appropriate police activity); see also Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on
Family Law Issues, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 431 (1985) (growing trend to use mediation may
dissipate gains achieved in legislatures and courts and hinder development of further rights).
Much work remains to be done to change misconceptions about domestic violence still preva-
lent among law enforcement officials and within society at large. See Waits, The Criminal
Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60
Wash. L. Rev. 267, 269 (1985).
265 Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 Harv. J. on Legis. 61, 65
(1984).
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by sexual harassment and innuendo, and therefore harm all women who
work there. 266 In addition, the claims as articulated recognized the con-
nection between the individual and collective components of the claim.2 67
Similarly, in the battered women context, the idea that women needed ex
parte orders of protection and that police owed a duty of care to battered
women transcended the individual dimension of the claim and illumi-
nated the problems of patriarchy. 26
Further, the articulation of these rights claims developed feminist
theory in several important ways. For example, in the battered women's
movement, claims of right in both civil and criminal contexts raised im-
portant questions for feminists about how to view the state. The claims
sharpened debate over the role of law in modifying the public and private
dichotomy, especially given the historic absence of law in the area of
domestic relations generally. Debates over whether feminists should sup-
port criminalization and other reform efforts within the criminal justice
266 The Supreme Court's opinion in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986),
affirms this broad perspective. Yet controversy exists over whether to formulate a claim for
relief from sexual harassment in the workplace as a tort (focusing on individual harm) or as a
violation of the civil rights of the class of individuals to which the victims of sexual harassment
belong (focusing on group harm). Catharine MacKinnon has argued that a tort remedy for
sexual harassment incorrectly treats the occurrence of sexual harassment in the workplace as
an injury to an individual, rather than as an injury to a class of individuals. C. MacKinnon,
supra note 213, at 88. On the other hand, courts have noted that statutory remedies fail to
capture the personal nature of the injury done to a sexually harassed plaintiff. Statutory reme-
dies "vindicate the rights of the victimized group without compensating the plaintiff for such
personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense of degradation, and the cost
of psychiatric care." Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 97, 689 P.2d 1292, 1303
(1984). In fact, most courts have held that common law remedies are not preempted by statu-
tory causes of action. See, e.g., Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, af'd, 251 Ga.
491, 307 S.E.2d 474 (1983); Holien, 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292. But see Wolk v. Saks Fifth
Avenue, 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to allow state common law cause of action for
tortious discharge where state statutory relief was exclusive remedy and where highest state
court had not addressed issue of coexistence of statutory and common law causes of action).
267 In relation to sexual harassment claims, MacKinnon observes that the notion that indi-
vidual and group claims are different "is elusive under a legal theory of group-based injury in a
legal system which requires representatively injured individual plaintiffs." MacKinnon, supra
note 253, at iv. She goes on to note:
Although sometimes injured one at a time. women are not discriminated against as
individuals. Indeed, the absence of treatment based upon personal differential qualities
is part of the harm of discrimination. At the same time, sexuality is no less individual to
a particular woman for being an attribute of women as a gender. In short, there is no
individual/group distinction here.
Id. (emphasis in original).
268 The need for ex parte orders is premised on a view that women as a class and battered
women as a subclass do not have the same access to the courts as do men. See Taub, Ex Parte
Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional
Scrutiny, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 95, 97 (1980).
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system to ameliorate the problem of battering269 clarified the need for a
feminist theory of the state that neither expressly relied upon nor rejected
the state. These debates underscored the ideological function of
criminalization in defining battery as a public and not a private harm,
and heightened the movement's analysis of reforms for battered women.
For instance, reforms could focus on the individual "bad" man, or the
individual woman's "victimization," but they then would not address the
shared experience of battered women, the common problems of patri-
archy, the conditions that create or perpetuate violence against women,
or the economic and social resources-jobs, child care, housing-that
battered women need to free themselves from dependence.
Some within the battered women's movement have been sensitive to
these tensions and have recognized the need for litigation and legal re-
forms in the context of political organizing and education.270 These ad-
vocates have sought to consider reform efforts within a theoretical
269 See S. Schechter, supra note 261, at 175-79. Schechter notes that most within the bat-
tered women's movement maintain an ambivalent attitude toward the criminal courts.
[Criminal punishment is seen as one way to force men to assume responsibility for
their actions. By making violence a crime, the movement offers psychological, symbolic,
and actual relief to women in their search to free themselves from abuse and self-blame.
Women's attempts to win justice through the courts is one important assertion of their
dignity and control over their lives.
Id. at 176. Yet reform efforts within the criminal justice system have severe limitations. "In
reality, the criminal justice system leaves many women frustrated.... Working within the
criminal justice system is particularly problematic for poor and third world women." Id. at
177.
270 Schechter argues that
[t]he battered women's movement must continue its advocacy and social change efforts
within the criminal justice system. At the same time, however, a fine tension needs to be
maintained so that advocacy and reform are balanced with building a broad-based, well
organized feminist movement and continuing community education efforts. Only in this
way will battered women's organizations retain the power base and community support
for which to demand institutional change. Although criminal sanctions to stop abuse
are a vital part of a solution to battered women's immediate problems, in the long run,
the community, not just the criminal justice system, must understand that violence
against women is rooted in male domination. Only by developing a philosophy of and
struggle for gender equality will a movement change public consciousness which in turn
will force individuals and institutions to treat violence against women as a serious
offense.
Id. at 180. Kathy Ferguson notes that the utility of legal reform efforts should be evaluated on
the basis of their "ability to challenge, not simply extend, the language and the practice of
bureaucratic capitalism." K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 193 (footnote omitted). She argues
that reform efforts are critical for feminism because they make other struggles possible-they
give women a sense of the possibilities of change, alleviate the pressure of immediate needs,
develop political skills, and build the capacity to translate personal problems into public issues.
Id. at 193-94. She distinguishes three different situations for legal reform effort: (1) where the
problem at hand is immediate, such as rape and battery; (2) where claims of equal opportunity
or affirmative action are made that can benefit individual women without challenging the sys-
tem, and (3) where women seek access to the military, which she rejects as an inappropriate
legal reform. Id. at 194-95.
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framework that focuses on the political effect and message of these ef-
forts. Such an approach evaluates a reform based on whether it helps to
redress the balance of power within the family, emphasize the broader
experience of sex discrimination within the family (rather than individual
victimization), and challenge the public and private dichotomy. Most
significantly, this approach evaluates whether a particular reform helps
to strengthen the women's movement and organize more women. 271
This approach underscores the role that rights claims can play in further-
ing political development. 272
In both the areas of sexual harassment and legal treatment of bat-
tered women, rights claims have strengthened public consciousness on
the issues and illuminated broader political perceptions of patriarchy and
sexual subordination. The women's movement has begun to reshape the
law in women's terms and has thus exposed new dilemmas and chal-
lenges. This effort to reshape law through the articulation of legal rights
has been an important aspect of the political struggle around these issues.
V
A DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE RECONSIDERED
What does an examination of the practice and experience of the
women's rights movement reveal about rights? Does it suggest that a
dialectical approach to the relationship between rights and politics is ap-
propriate? I want to draw some implications for theory from the wom-
en's movement's experience with rights and relate this experience to the
earlier discussion of a dialectical perspective.
The women's movement's experience with rights shows how rights
emerge from political struggle. The legal formulation of the rights grew
out of and reflected feminist experience and vision and culminated in a
political demand for power. The articulation of feminist theory in prac-
tice in turn heightened feminist consciousness of theoretical dilemmas
and at the same time advanced feminist theoretical development. This
271 Feminist theoretician and activist Charlotte Bunch has posed five questions to help eval-
uate reform efforts for women. See Bunch, The Reform Tool, in Building Feminist Theory:
Essays from Quest 189, 196-98 (1981). First, "Does [the reform] materially improve the lives
of women and if so, which women and how many?" Id. at 196. Second, "Does the reform
build an individual woman's self-respect, strength, and confidence?" Id. at 197. Third, "Does
working for the reform give women a sense of power, strength and imagination as a group, and
help build structures for further change?" Id. Fourth, "Does the struggle for reform educate
women politically, enhancing their ability to criticize and challenge the system in the future?"
Id. at 198. Fifth, "Does the reform weaken patriarchal control of society's institutions and
help women gain power over them?" Id.
272 Although there may be practical and strategic differences between making rights claims
in courts, utilizing legal fora generally, and pursuing legislative reform, discussion of the dis-
tinct considerations involved in each is outside the scope of this Article.
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experience, reflecting the dynamic interrelationship of theory and prac-
tice, mirrored the experience of the women's movement in general.
This analysis of the women's rights movement, shaped by an under-
standing of praxis, reveals a conception of both the process through
which rights are formulated as well as the content of the rights them-
selves. The process has been "regenerative" 273 as rights were developed
in the "middle," not at the "end," of political dialogue. Rights were the
product of consciousness-raising and were often articulated by both polit-
ical activists and lawyers translating and explaining their own experi-
ence. Further, rights asserted in the context of the women's movement
enabled women to develop an individual and collective identity as women
and to understand the connection between individual and community.
The articulation of rights, then, has been a means of projecting, reflect-
ing, and building upon a burgeoning sense of community developing
within the women's movement.
The content of these rights contained both individual and communal
dimensions. A particular right did not simply benefit a particular
woman, but rather benefited women as a class. Rights claims illuminated
and expressed experiences of women as a class because newly developed
perceptions of women's experience defined and gave meaning to the indi-
vidual claims of rights. In this sense, as Lynd's formulation suggests,
these rights did not simply relate to individual women, but expanded the
opportunities for women as a class. 274 Litigation over reproductive
rights, sexual harassment, and battering illuminated the common experi-
ences of women by establishing individual women's entitlement to relief.
Admittedly, claims for equal rights have not captured the experi-
ence of women as a class as effectively as the other rights claims detailed
above.2 75 Although these claims for equal rights have been shaped and
defined to some degree by collective experience, they appear to have a
weaker collective and stronger individual dimension. Further, equality
litigation itself has not focused on the social and economic preconditions
for equal treatment.2 76 Thus, although these cases attacked important
stereotypes affecting women as a class, they communicated the sense that
an equal rights perspective only affords individual women access to treat-
ment as males.
In fairness, it could be said that the content of women's rights in all
these areas was "traditional" or individualistic. But this characteriza-
tion minimizes the importance of context. 277 Since rights in the women's
273 See text accompanying notes 152-59 supra.
274 See text accompanying notes 104-12 supra.
275 See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
276 See Fineman, supra note 206, at 816-20; Finley, supra note 252, at 1120-22.
277 Karst suggests that "women's insistence on the need to appreciate the whole context in
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movement experience emerged in the middle of "conversation," and be-
gan a process of articulating political vision connected to political pro-
gram, their meaning and content have been closely tied to the political
practice of the women's movement. If the rights claim is part of a larger
process and the movement believes that the rights claim expresses its vi-
sion, the claim is likely to have a greater impact on the movement itself.
If the movement sees rights claims as an integral part of the struggle, but
not the exclusive focus, the process of rights assertion will more likely
activate, than pacify, the social movement.
Indeed, the content of women's rights claims suggests Karst's juris-
prudence of interdependence. 278 Rights language was not simply "occu-
pied." The source of the claims, women's experience, modified the
substance of the claims themselves. Feminist litigation has reflected
many of the aspects which Karst discusses-creativity, experience, intui-
tion, and the use of a broader political and social context.279 Perhaps the
ladder of rights can, in some contexts, be reshaped by the web of connec-
tion. Perhaps rights, in some contexts, can truly be interdependent or at
least can have interdependent dimensions.
The use of rights and legal struggle by the women's movement
started the "conversation" about women's role in society. Assertion of
equal rights, reproductive rights, rights to be free from sexual harassment
and battering assisted political organizing and education at least early in
the women's movement. Rights discourse encouraged the articulation of
feminist vision and furthered the process of political assertion. In this
sense, legal formulations of these rights laid the basis for the further ar-
ticulation of women's demands. By challenging notions of equality, for
example, women sought to enter the world of public citizenship. But the
persistence of separate spheres of work and family divided along gender-
based lines, and the tenacity of female responsibility for child rearing
emerged as limitations to that world. Nonetheless this language of equal-
ity was a necessary prerequisite for the development of the different vi-
sions and strategies that the legal formulation of this problem, the debate
over equal/special treatment of pregnancy, has eventually revealed. 280
The articulation of rights claims energized the women's movement
and started the conversation. But once a right is articulated, or even
won, the issues change. How will the right be applied? How will it be
enforced? Women's rights have been necessary for the political develop-
which moral issues arise drives them to widen inquiry, to redefine issues, to expand the range
of possible solutions." Karst, supra note 57, at 499. The full development of these issues in
the context of women's right litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
278 Id. at 494-95.
279 See text accompanying notes 165-70 supra.
280 See note 252 supra.
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ment of women, particularly because they combat the privatization of
women's oppression. However, rights, although they must vigorously be
fought for, cannot perform the task of social reconstruction. The present
economic crisis for women in this country281 underscores the need for a
radical redefinition of social and economic responsibility and a restruc-
turing of work and family which would transform the lives of women,
particularly the many women who live in poverty. Rights, even rights
which are interdependent, can only begin to help people organize them-
selves and identify with larger groups.
Even if one agrees that rights claims can be interdependent and that
the rights claims in the women's movement have had this character, an
important question remains: does the experience of rights change accord-
ing to gender, culture, class, or race?282 Are rights asserted by a particu-
lar group at a particular time in fact more interdependent, or are they
just perceived that way? Is the content of an interdependent right more
collective than a traditional right?2 83
281 See note 210 supra.
282 Carol Stack, an anthropologist whose work examines issues of class and race, see C.
Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community (1974), has suggested to me
that it is difficult to know if the psychological developmental issues which Gilligan raises con-
cerning the role that rights can play will be the same for different groups. See also Stack, The
Culture of Gender: Women and Men of Color, 11 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 321, 323
(1986) (positing "contextualization of morality and the meaning of social ties as a cultural
alternative to Gilligan's model of moral development"). The richness and power of the
presentations challenging the CLS critique of rights from different minority perspectives, that I
heard while attending the Tenth Annual Conference on Critical Legal Studies (Los Angeles,
California 1987), confirm the importance of this inquiry.
283 Important questions lurking beneath the surface of this Article are whether women's
experience of rights might be more interdependent than men's experience, and whether the
content of rights asserted by the women's movement has been more collective. Gilligan now
claims that the dichotomy of rights and care is not linked to gender; her recent work under-
scores that she is talking about a "different voice," not a female voice. Feminist Discourse,
supra note 57, at 47. This suggests that an understanding of the dialectical relatedness of the
ladder of rights and web of connection is not particular to women-it may be an aspect of an
individual's or a group's experience of rights more generally.
On the other hand, some feminist theorists have argued that Gilligan's description of web-
like rights is particular to women because women have a sense of self based more on connec-
tion with others than separation. See K. Ferguson, supra note 57, at 161. For example, Carol
Stack has suggested to me that since women's sense of self is more closely intertwined with a
sense of other, women's experience of rights may have less of an exclusively individual and
more of a collective dimension. Does this suggest that women's experience of a sense of self-
assertion through rights claims has a more dialectical aspect and communal dimension than
men's experience? If, as Gilligan suggests, empathy, compassion, and the ability to integrate
diverse needs rather than balance opposing claims are more common to women, how does this
affect women's experience of legal rights?
Of course it is arguable that rights are not transformative-that even rights infused by
values of the web will not be different. Perhaps rights merely legitimize grumbling and dissat-
isfactions, but retain their individual focus. Perhaps a more realistic and limited view of rights
claims for women is that rights can only help women to assert themselves and see self and
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The experience of rights in the women's movement supports the
need for a perspective on rights and politics grounded in a dialectical
sensibility, a view that allows us to acknowledge both the universal, af-
firming, expressive, and creative aspects of rights claims and at the same
time, maintain a critical impulse towards rights. We must hold on to and
not seek to deny the contradictions between the possibilities and the lim-
its of rights claims and discourse. In the women's movement, a wide
range of feminist activists and commentators have participated in a broad
critique of rights analysis, both on theoretical and practical levels. 284 A
common theme of these critiques has been the need to strengthen legal
challenges for equal rights while at the same time not limiting our vision
to a narrow conception of rights. We need to continue to strive for a
political strategy that expresses a politics and vision of social reconstruc-
tion sensitive to women's real concerns. Legal strategy must be devel-
oped in the context of political strategy. It should attack formal
doctrinal barriers which inhibit the recognition of the interconnectedness
of women's oppression and look at the particular factual context of dis-
crimination in shaping legal responses.
A struggle for rights can be both a vehicle of politics and an affirma-
tion of who we are and what we seek. Rights can be what we make of
them and how we use them. The experience of rights assertion in the
women's movement can move us forward to a self-reflective recognition
of the importance and the limitations of political and legal strategy that
utilizes rights.
other as separate and individuated, but cannot do more. Perhaps web-like rights simply en-
courage judgment that is more tolerant and less absolute.
As feminists we want the possibilities of inclusion without the problems of self-sacrifice.
We want to inform rights with feminist concerns of care and connection and use rights to
protect women from too much caring. Id. at 171. With rights as a buffer, women's experience
will not be "distorted by subordination or rendered partial by a too-great fear of loss." Id. at
197.
284 See sources cited in note 213 supra.
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